Reframing International Financial Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis: Rational States and Interdependence, not Regulatory Networks and Soft Law by Turk, Matthew C.
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 36 Issue 1 
2014 
Reframing International Financial Regulation After the Global 
Financial Crisis: Rational States and Interdependence, not 
Regulatory Networks and Soft Law 
Matthew C. Turk 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Transnational 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew C. Turk, Reframing International Financial Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis: Rational 
States and Interdependence, not Regulatory Networks and Soft Law, 36 MICH. J. INT'L L. 59 (2014). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol36/iss1/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
REFRAMING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATION AFTER THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS: RATIONAL STATES AND
INTERDEPENDENCE, NOT REGULATORY
NETWORKS AND SOFT LAW
Matthew C. Turk*
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A. Bretton Woods (1944–1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
B. Financial Integration & Early Coordination
(1973–1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
C. The New International Financial Architecture
(1994–2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
D. The 2008 Financial Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
II. INTERDEPENDENCE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
A. Harmonization of Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
1. Defining the Interdependence Problem. . . . . . . . . . 78
2. Evaluating Harmonization of Standards . . . . . . . . . 81
B. Crisis Prevention: Maintaining Capital Adequacy . . . . 85
1. Defining the Interdependence Problem. . . . . . . . . . 85
2. Evaluating International Capital Adequacy
Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
C. Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
1. Cross-Border Bank Resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2. An International Lender of Last Resort . . . . . . . . . 101
III. IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
A. Policy: Implications for the Design of International
Financial Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
1. A World Financial Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2. Incremental Policy Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B. Theory: Implications for the International Law
Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
1. Response to Critiques of the Rational State
Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
2. A Critique of Transgovernmental Networks and
Soft Law Literatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
* Clerk to the Honorable Ferdinand F. Fernandez, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit; J.D., 2010, New York University School of Law.
59
60 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 36:59
INTRODUCTION
The British bank Northern Rock failed on September 14, 2007; U.S.
investment bank Bear Stearns collapsed on March 17, 2008 and was sub-
ject to a government-engineered takeover by J.P. Morgan Chase; and, on
the night of September 15, 2008, U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers
filed for bankruptcy and sent global financial markets into disarray the
following Monday morning. These financial institutions shared several fea-
tures in common prior to their downfall, but perhaps the most curious is
that they were each considered fully compliant with the second generation
framework for the Basel Accords on Capital Adequacy (Basel II),1 an in-
ternational agreement requiring banks to maintain capital levels consistent
with then, state-of-the-art risk metrics.2 Basel II, it turns out, was insuffi-
cient to ward off the insolvency of many large, multinational financial
institutions.
The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision was not the only interna-
tional body exercising oversight of financial firms and markets prior to the
global financial crisis of 2008 (2008 Crisis). One function of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) was to provide continuous “surveillance” of
international markets.3 Among other occasions, it did so informally in
September of 2008 by publishing statements of its president Olivier
Blanchard, entitled “Blanchard Sees Global Economy Weathering Finan-
cial Storm.”4 Contrary to the IMF’s forecast, however, Lehman Brothers
collapsed just two weeks later and the global economy capsized in the en-
suing financial storm.
1. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2006) [here-
inafter BASEL II], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf.
2. In fact, Northern Rock executives testified to paying a dividend months before the
bank’s failure because of a substantial regulatory capital surplus above Basel II requirements.
See Press Release, Chairman Christopher Cox, Chairman Cox Letter to Basel Committee in
Support of New Guidance on Liquidity Management (Mar 20, 2008), available at http://sec
.gov/news/press/2008/2008-48.htm (“[A]t all times until its agreement to be acquired by JP
Morgan Chase during the weekend, [Bear Stearns] had a capital cushion well above what is
required to meet supervisory standards calculated using the Basel II standard.”); U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n Office of Inspector Gen., SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Enti-
ties: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, Report No. 446-A, at 10–11 (Sept. 2008).
See generally, John F. Rosato, Down the Road to Perdition: How the Flaws of Basel II Led to
the Collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 475 (2011) (providing a
critical account of Basel II’s role in capital adequacy regulation).
3. See IMF Executive Board Adopts New Decision on Bilateral Surveillance Over
Members’ Policies, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 07/69, INT’L MONETARY FUND
[IMF] (June 21, 2007). See generally, Marcel Fratzscher & Julien Reynaud, IMF Surveillance
and Financial Markets—A Political Economy Analysis, 27 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 405 (2011)
(analyzing the increasing role of surveillance in the IMF’s agenda).
4. Blanchard Sees Global Economy Weathering Financial Storm, IMF SURVEY ON-
LINE (Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/int090208a.htm. The
IMF president’s optimistic analysis turned largely on speculation over future fluctuations in
oil prices, rather than the robustness of the subprime mortgage market or large financial
institutions.
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Other disheartening anecdotes regarding international financial regu-
lation abound. But the essential point is that, leading up to the 2008 Crisis,
the performance of the so-called “new international financial architecture”
(NIFA)—the constellation of international agreements and institutions de-
veloped in response to the financial crises of the 1990s5—was unimpres-
sive. The 2008 Crisis revealed the weaknesses of the international financial
architecture, and has made regulation of the global financial system a cen-
tral problem facing international law and the world economy.
This Article analyzes the post-2008 efforts at institutional develop-
ment and international cooperation in finance, and seeks to identify which
regulatory projects are likely to succeed and which are not. The overarch-
ing aim is to reframe the discussion concerning international financial reg-
ulation by taking a step back to investigate the big questions: What exactly
are the externalities of cross-border finance that make international regu-
latory cooperation worth attempting? What are the specific incentive and
informational barriers that sovereign states face when addressing these ex-
ternalities? Which of the tools that states have employed—whether in the
form of organizations or particular rules and agreements—have proven
useful, and why? Do post-2008 reforms avoid the underlying causes of pre-
vious regulatory failures, or not?
In answering these questions, this Article captures the value added by
applying a back-to-the-basics rational choice approach to this increasingly
complicated and important area of international law.6 The analysis pro-
ceeds by assuming that rational states are the ultimate actors in interna-
tional law.7 States craft international rules and institutions to capture the
joint gains available from correcting international externalities, referred to
here as “interdependence problems.” The starting point is to identify in-
terdependence problems, and examine the ability of rational states to
overcome them given the specific strategic incentives and information con-
5. See Michael Camdessus, Towards a New Financial Architecture for a Globalized
World, Address at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London (May 8, 1998) (pro-
viding an early use of the term and laying out the regimes basic principles).
6. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Rational Choice Institutionalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, 23, 24–27 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006). See, e.g., ANDREW
GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2010); ROB-
ERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY (1984); ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012); ROBERT SCOTT & PAUL STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN:
CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
7. See DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNA-
TIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES, 6 (2007) (applying Putnam’s two-level approach, and
describing it as follows: “Domestic factors account for preference formation, but not the
outcomes of international bargaining . . . The second step is to take [state] preferences as a
given for international interactions, and to explain the bargaining outcomes as a function of
the distribution of interests and capabilities.”); Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 427 (1988).
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straints they face.8 In doing so, it is important to remember that states
confront interdependence problems arising from upheavals in both sover-
eign and private sector financial markets, which influence and interact
with one another.9 The significance of international regulatory coopera-
tion can then be understood within this framework.
At a high level, international financial regulation can be divided into
the dual goals of maximizing the potential efficiency gains from global in-
tegration of financial markets and minimizing the losses threatened by the
crises and instability that have historically characterized financial integra-
tion. The provision of stability can in turn be broken down into ex ante
efforts at crisis prevention and ex post efforts at crisis management.10
From this basic rubric, four foundational interdependence problems can
be derived, in which the globalization of finance creates potential gains
from international cooperation: (1) harmonizing financial standards to
lower the cost of cross-border transactions and increase the efficiency of
financial integration; (2) maintaining the capital adequacy of financial in-
stitutions across jurisdictions to prevent crises ex ante; and, managing cri-
ses ex post by (3) establishing a cross-border resolution mechanism to
unwind failed firms, and by (4) implementing an international lender-of-
last-resort function to intervene in sovereign debt or currency crises.
In evaluating the degree to which a particular interdependence prob-
lem is amenable to effective international regulation, it is useful to begin
with the standard game-theory distinction between problems of “coordina-
tion” and “cooperation.”11 The three interdependence problems concern-
ing crisis prevention and management resemble cooperation games rather
than coordination games. This means that they are subject to incentive
problems that make effective regulation more difficult to obtain than in
the case of harmonization of standards.12 This Article presents the game-
theoretic intuition behind each interdependence problem and measures it
against the actual historical performance of the international financial ar-
8. See, e.g., POSNER & SYKES, supra note 6, at 17; Emile M Hafner-Burton, David G.
Victor, & Yonatan Lupu, Political Science Research on International Law: The State of the
Field 17–19 (Laboratory on Int’l L. & Regulation [ILAR] Working Paper No. 1, 2011).
9. The experience of Greece, Spain and other European countries during the 2008
Crisis illustrates this point well. However, most prominent accounts that are putatively com-
prehensive in scope limit themselves to regulatory issues created by banks and other private
financial institutions. See, e.g., Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and
How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 326–27 (2011); Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Interna-
tional Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 449 (2008); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The
Political Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405, 1409 (2013).
10. See Steven Schwarcz, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Financial Regulation,
15 CHAP. L. REV. 257 (2011).
11. See generally, Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implica-
tions for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985).
12. Specifically, all three encourage opportunistic free riding and can be modeled as
multilateral prisoner’s dilemmas. Harmonization can be modeled as a “battle-of-the-sexes”
coordination game, in which the incentives to form and comply with agreements are greater.
See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER, & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 41–43 (explaining battle of sexes games); POSNER & SYKES, supra note 6, at 27.
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chitecture up to and during the 2008 Crisis. The Article then turns to the
international financial architecture’s prospects going forward in light of
post-2008 reforms. The theoretical insights and historical record are found
to be consistent with one another. Together, they support the mixed but
somewhat pessimistic conclusion that, post-2008, the international finan-
cial architecture will succeed at enhancing the efficiency of cross-border
finance but continue to struggle with the more ambitious goal of reducing
global financial instability.
A policy implication of this Article’s analysis is that ambitious propos-
als for reform—such as calls for a World Financial Organization (WFO)
analogous to the World Trade Organization (WTO)13—are less promising
than more incremental regulatory projects. The analogy to the WTO
breaks down, because the interdependence problems of finance differ
from those of international trade in important respects that cannot be
overcome by simply choosing a more centralized and legalized institu-
tional structure.14 Although transformative reforms to the financial archi-
tecture are therefore unlikely to be effective, there are two general types
of incremental policy solutions that may yield better results.
The first type of incremental policy solution concerns pursuing oppor-
tunities for coordination that are embedded in larger, thornier cooperation
problems. One application of this approach is the early-stage efforts to
facilitate cooperation on cross-border bank resolution by harmonizing
standards that require multinational banks to produce resolution plans,
also known as living wills.15 Harmonized resolution plans could provide a
common informational base that would allow states to resolve failed mul-
tinational financial institutions in a more efficient and timely manner.
A second kind of incremental reform involves scaling global coopera-
tion problems to the regional level. Limiting the geographic scope of regu-
latory agreements may mitigate incentives for free riding and non-
compliance, because at the regional level states are less numerous, have
more homogenous capacities and interests, and often enjoy a deeper his-
tory of legal and economic interaction. Attempts to provide a regional
13. See, e.g., Oscar Landerretche, et al., Toward the World Finance Organization: New
Financial Architecture Based on a Strategic Regulation Model (Sept. 28, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Institute for Advanced Development Studies); Eric Helleiner &
Stefano Pagliari, Towards a New Bretton Woods? The First G20 Leaders Summit and the
Regulation of Global Finance, 14 NEW POL. ECON. 275, 275 (2009); Daniel Bases, World
Faces New Bretton Woods Moment: Stiglitz, REUTERS UK (Nov. 6 2008), available at http://
uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE4A58BI20081106; Barry J. Eichengreen, Out of the Box
Thoughts about the International Financial Architecture (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/09/
116, 2009).
14. In contrast to trade, the relevant externalities in finance are diffuse and multilat-
eral rather than bilateral, the information costs of monitoring compliance can be prohibitive,
and there is no consensus on optimal policies that can be articulated with simple rules. See
infra Section III.A.1.
15. Resolution plans are documents that specify a financial institution’s legal structure
and counterparty obligations in order to provide a roadmap for regulators in the event that
an emergency liquidation becomes necessary. See infra Section III.A.2.
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lender of last resort mechanism are in their infancy in Latin America and
Asia, but the European Central Bank and European Commission’s inter-
ventions in Europe’s sovereign debt crisis illustrate the potential advan-
tages of regionalism.
Addressing the foundational issues of international financial regula-
tion with the simple rational choice framework presented here constitutes
a “reframing” of the field, because the dominant scholarship in this area,
while presumably retaining some domain for rational state action, often
incorporates more unwieldy theoretical variables. However, introducing
theoretical complications can potentially reduce an argument’s explana-
tory power rather than add nuance.16 For example, a frequent claim in the
literature is that there is a need to abandon the rational state assumption
in order to explain patterns of international cooperation on finance, in-
cluding the failure of states to produce an optimal international financial
architecture.17 But as this Article seeks to demonstrate, a basic rational-
state approach to international financial law can provide a good account of
patterns of regulatory design, compliance, and effectiveness. Moreover, to
the extent that more fine-grained, descriptive analyses—such as those fo-
cusing on historical path dependence or interest group structures—discard
rather than supplement the rational-state assumption, these analyses can
fall upon explanatory problems themselves.
The most significant theoretical critique presented by the relatively
stripped-down approach of this Article concerns the influential scholar-
ship on “transgovernmental networks” of regulators18 and the non-bind-
ing “soft law” agreements that they create.19 These literatures argue that
16. Cf. GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL IN-
QUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH, 29–30, 104 (1994) (“Good social
science seeks to increase the significance of what is explained relative to the information used
in the explanation . . . Explanation of anything seems to require a host of explanatory vari-
ables: we use a lot to explain a little. In such cases, our goal should be to design research with
more leverage.”).
17. See, e.g., DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, 2–3 (2007); Gadinis, supra note 9 (arguing that
patterns of international financial regulation are incoherent without examining the structure
of interest groups); Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case
of Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589, 590, 601 (2001); Verdier, supra note 9, at
1425–27 (arguing that patterns of international financial regulation are incoherent without
resort to historical path dependence and interest group politics explanations).
18. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Daniel C.
Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115
YALE L.J. 1490 (2006); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Trans-
governmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L.I (2002);
Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes Global: An Update, 2 ANN. REV.
LAW SOC. SCI. 211 (2006); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight
Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998)
[hereinafter International Law by Other Means].
19. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in Interna-
tional Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Brummer, supra note 9, at 326–27; Chris Brum-
mer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—And Not Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L.
623 (2010); David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA. J.
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networks and soft law are both pervasive and effective instruments of in-
ternational regulation.20 Furthermore, they attribute their greatest empiri-
cal support to finance, where soft law-producing networks such as the
Basel Committee and the Financial Stability Board are prominent.
The analysis presented here demonstrates that the networks and soft
law scholarship dramatically overstates its case at both the evaluative and
descriptive levels. Measured by their ability to successfully address the in-
terdependence problems outlined in this Article, networks and soft law
mechanisms do not stand out relative to other institutional forms. They
have only made real progress with respect to the harmonization of stan-
dards, an area in which private industry groups have enjoyed equal or
even greater success.21 Scholarship on networks and soft law also misses
the mark as a purely descriptive matter of the role these phenomena play
in the international regulation of finance. Despite claims that networks
and soft law wholly occupy the field, the mode and degree of legalization
of any particular endeavor in international financial cooperation is highly
varied. This Article shows that networks, treaty-based international orga-
nizations (such as the IMF), private industry groups (such as the Interna-
tional Swaps and Derivatives Swaps Association, Inc.), and purely political
bodies (such as the G20) are all deeply involved in the regulation of inter-
national finance in overlapping ways. It follows then, that the at times
celebratory scholarship on networks and soft law should reconsider some
of its core claims. In comparison, the framework presented here offers a
more accurate and parsimonious story of how international cooperation
on financial regulation works.
This Article is organized as follows. Section I provides a historical
overview, which traces the development and performance of the interna-
tional financial architecture from World War II through the 2008 Crisis.
Section II then presents the four interdependence problems posed by
global finance and evaluates the ability of the post-2008 financial architec-
ture to address them. Next, Section III.A explores the implications of this
Article’s main findings for policy reforms. Finally, Section III.B examines
the implications for the theoretical literature on international financial
law, including that on transgovernmental networks and soft law.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE
This Section provides an overview of the historical evolution of inter-
national cooperation on the regulation of global finance since World War
INT’L L., 686 (2012) [hereinafter Finding Legal Principle]; David Zaring, Informal Procedure,
Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI J. INT’L L. 547 (2005) [hereinafter In-
formal Procedure].
20. See infra Section III.B.1 (providing specific citations to claims made in these
articles).
21. This fact carries a certain irony, because the literature typically regards private
industry groups as inferior vehicles for policymaking relative to networks of regulators. See,
e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 18, at 9–10.
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II. The historical perspective provides context, but also illuminates several
key features of international financial regulation and the global economy
within which it operates. First, since the 1960s, there has been a steady
trend of cross-border integration of financial markets, accompanied by an
equally consistent trend of increasing financial instability. Second, finan-
cial instability has appeared both in the form of sovereign debt and cur-
rency crises, and private sector banking crises. Third, in response to
deepening market integration, states have cooperated by developing inter-
national institutions with the aim of either increasing the efficiency of
cross-border financial transactions, or reducing and containing financial
crises and instability. Lastly, the international financial architecture has
been characterized by the variety of its institutional forms, which include
organizations that are public and private, legal and informal. Section II
analyzes the interdependence problems of international financial regula-
tion against this historical backdrop.
A. Bretton Woods (1944–1973)
Modern regulation of the international economic system began at a
meeting in July of 1944 among the victorious allies in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire. There, a set of agreements was made that became known as
the “Bretton Woods system.”22 An important feature of the Bretton
Woods system was that it was designed to be administered by a handful of
treaty-based international organizations: the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Trade Organization (ITO), and the IMF.23 Although the former two
organizations were quickly marginalized,24 the IMF emerged as the key
institution during this period because of its role in facilitating monetary
coordination.25 A second central feature of Bretton Woods was its policy
of fixed exchange rates, which were intended to serve as a functional
equivalent to the pre-War War I gold standard system.26 Pursuant to the
IMF Articles of Agreement, the United States was to commit to the gold
standard and maintain the convertibility of U.S. dollars to gold at a rate of
$35 per ounce.27 All other IMF members then agreed to peg their curren-
22. See generally, Michael D. Bordo, The Bretton Woods International Monetary Sys-
tem: A Historical Overview, in A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LES-
SONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM, 3 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen
eds., 1993).
23. See Rolf H. Weber & Douglas W. Arner, Toward A New Design for International
Financial Regulation, 29 U. PENN. J. INT’L L. 391, 395–96 (2008).
24. The World Bank was originally conceived as a vehicle for post-war reconstruction,
but was quickly marginalized by the Marshall Plan. Id. at 394. The ITO also floundered at its
outset and was displaced by a complex collection of trading rules known as “the GATT”
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which was later transformed into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND
THE WTO 196–97 (2000); Weber & Arner, supra note 23, at 394.
25. Weber & Arner, supra note 23, at 397.
26. Id., at 395.
27. Bordo, supra note 22, at 23–25 tbl.1.2. See ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE IMF,
art. IV §§ 1, 4(b), 5, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401.
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cies to the dollar at a fixed rate and to intervene in foreign exchange mar-
kets when necessary to maintain their peg.28
The Bretton Woods system was remarkably stable over the two de-
cades following 1945, during which time international financial disruptions
were rare.29 One reason for this stability was that the fixed exchange rate
system required strict capital controls, which meant that financial markets
at the time were largely un-integrated. Another, perhaps more fundamen-
tal, factor contributing to the financial tranquility was a run of global
macroeconomic stability in which most advanced economies experienced
steady growth while inflation and interest rates remained low and
steady.30 In retrospect, the Bretton Woods period was a relatively halcyon
time when finance was not yet global in character, and as a result, required
little international regulatory attention beyond the IMF’s role in coordi-
nating exchange rates.
B. Financial Integration & Early Coordination (1973–1994)
Cross-border integration of financial markets began to gain momen-
tum in the late 1960s and ushered in a newfound instability as it acceler-
ated through the 1970s.31 Eventually, this led to growing U.S. current
account deficits, which spurred a global run on the dollar from 1968 to
1971, and ultimately caused Richard Nixon to suspend the direct converti-
bility of dollars to gold and to devalue the dollar to $38 per ounce pursu-
ant to the Smithsonian Agreement.32 These measures proved insufficient,
and in 1973 the Bretton Woods system completely unraveled: the dollar
was allowed to float, foreign currencies dropped their peg to the dollar,
and the post-War era of fixed exchange rates came to an end.33 The 1970s
also saw the first notable failures of large, internationally interconnected
financial institutions, namely Germany’s Bankhaus Herstatt and the
United States’s Franklin National Bank, both in 1974.34
Modest forms of international cooperation on finance began to take
hold even as the Bretton Woods system fell apart. The “Group of 10,”
28. Bordo, supra note 22, at 37.
29. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT:
EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 205 fig. 13.1, 253 fig. 16.2 (2009).
30. See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKER’S NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 47 (2012).
31. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, EXORBITANT PRIVILEGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
DOLLAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 49–66 (2012); REIN-
HART & ROGOFF, supra note 29, at 206; Beth A. Simmons, The Internationalization of Capi-
tal, in CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 36, 44 (Herbert Kitschelt,
Peter Lange, Gary Marks & John D. Stephens eds., 2000).
32. Richard Myrus, Note, From Bretton Woods to Brussels: A Legal Analysis of Ex-
change-Rate Arrangements of the International Monetary Fund and the European Commu-
nity, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2095, 2102–04 (1994).
33. See EICHENGREEN, supra note 31, at 57–62.
34. Verdier, supra note 9, at 1416. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT
ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES, 267–69 (5th Ed.
2005).
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consisting of finance ministers and central bank governors from the
United States and other advanced economies, began meeting in the late
1960s and coordinated their exit from the Bretton Woods system.35 In re-
sponse to the failure of Bankhaus Herstatt, the Group of 10 established
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision under the auspices of the
Bank of International Settlements (BIS). In 1975, the Basel Committee
signed its “Concordat,” which outlined core principles of banking supervi-
sion.36 The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), a pri-
vate sector group founded in 1973, also became active during this period
and sought to harmonize accounting standards in response to the growing
internationalization of capital markets.37
The dual trends of increasing market integration and financial up-
heaval continued during the 1980s.38 In 1979, the Federal Reserve’s deci-
sion under Paul Volcker to sharply raise the federal funds rate triggered a
financial crisis in Latin American countries, which had been pursuing a
borrowing-heavy development strategy known as import-substitution-in-
dustrialization and could no longer service their ballooning public debts at
higher rates. Mexico defaulted in August of 1982, and Latin America’s
“Lost Decade” followed.39 This period also experienced more high-profile
instances of financial institution failure than the 1970s, including many
small banks during the U.S. Savings & Loan crisis, Banco Ambrosiano of
Italy in 1982, Continental Illinois in 1984, and the Bank of Credit and
Commerce International in 1991.40
As with the 1970s, international regulatory coordination in the 1980s
and early 1990s sought to both mitigate the turbulence resulting from
growing, and increasingly interconnected, financial markets, and develop
arrangements to capture the gains from trade made possible by greater
integration. In an attempt at crisis management, the IMF provided emer-
gency lending during the Latin American debt crisis and the United States
35. See Verdier, supra note 9, at 1416.  The Group of 10 consisted of:  Belgium, Ca-
nada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and the United States.
36. COMM. ON BANKING REGULATIONS & SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, REPORT TO THE GOVERNORS ON THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN, BS/
75/44E (1975) [hereinafter BASEL CONCORDAT]. See DANIEL TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL:
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 4 (2008) (detailing the origins of
the BIS).
37. See KEES CAMFFERMAN & STEPHEN A. ZEFF, FINANCIAL REPORTING AND
GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
COMMITTEE, 1973-2000, 43–45 (2007).
38. See Simmons, supra note 31, at 44.
39. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 34, at 170; Julia Preston & Samuel Dil-
lon, OPENING MEXICO: THE MAKING OF A DEMOCRACY, 123 (2004).
40. The saving-and-loan firm Home State Savings Bank collapsed in 1985, with
thousands more S&Ls needing to be resolved by federal agencies thereafter. Continental
Illinois, the first institution to be dubbed “Too Big to Fail,” was the largest U.S. bank failure
ever until Washington Mutual’s collapse in 2008. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note
34, at 170, 219–21, 267–69.
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tried to facilitate debt restructuring through a variety of programs, includ-
ing the failed Baker Plan and slightly more successful issuance of “Brady
Bonds.”41 As a measure for crisis prevention, BIS members agreed to the
Basel Capital Accords (Basel I), which outlined capital requirements for
banks based on the perceived riskiness of their assets.42 Efforts to increase
the efficiency of cross-border finance included the formation in 1986 of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), a trans-
governmental network of domestic securities regulators that worked to
harmonize regulatory standards for capital markets.43 Similarly, in 1985, a
private industry group known as the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) was founded.  The ISDA began developing its
“Master Agreement” to standardize transactions in over-the-counter de-
rivatives, which was eventually completed in 1992.44 Finally, the Interna-
tional Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), another network of
regulators, was formed in 1994.45 Thus, in the first few decades of post-
Bretton Woods financial market integration, the interdependence
problems and regulatory strategies that are at center stage today were al-
ready in sight.
C. The New International Financial Architecture (1994–2007)
The collapse of Bretton Woods left a void in the governance of inter-
national finance that was not fully filled until after the 1990s financial cri-
ses originating in Mexico and East Asia. Mexico exited its stagnant 1980s
with economic growth that was led by a combination of market liberaliza-
tion, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and rising debt. But progress
came to a halt with its “Tequila Crisis” in December of 1994, when the
government announced that it would devalue the peso and drop its peg to
41. See Alberto Gonzalo Santos, Beyond Baker and Brady: Deeper Debt Reduction for
Latin American Sovereign Debtors, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 66, 78–81, 110 (1991) (“The Baker
Plan was a failure from the perspective of the Latin American debtors, and the new Brady
Initiative, by failing to provide for sufficient debt reduction, will likely not result in effective
relief either.”).
42. BASEL II, supra note 1, ¶¶ 40–49.
43. See SINGER, supra note 17, at 72–73; Verdier, supra note 9, at 1418 (“Unlike Basel
I,” the formation of IOSCO, “was not prompted by an identifiable crisis, but rather by a
sense that securities regulators increasingly faced common problems, particularly in respect
to cross-border transactions.”).
44. Based out of New York, the ISDA has over 815 members from 60 countries, which
include, global, international and regional banks, asset managers, energy and commodities
firms, government and supranational entities, insurers and diversified financial institutions,
corporations, law firms, exchanges, clearinghouses and other service providers. ISDA.org,
About ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/.
45. About IAIS, INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS [IAIS], http://www.iaisweb.org/
(last visited Aug. 20, 2013); see generally Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of Interna-
tional Norms for Insurance Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 954, 963 (2009) (describing the
origins of the IAIS).
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the dollar.46 The Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 roughly resembled the
preceding episode in Mexico.47 A period of financial market liberalization,
credit expansion, and rapid growth for several East Asian countries came
to an end with the collapse of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997.48 Financial
market “contagion” spread to other previously booming economies in the
region, including Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Malaysia,
and eventually to seemingly remote Russia.49 A surprising casualty of this
turmoil was U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM),50
which collapsed after Russia defaulted on its debt in September of 1998.
Foreshadowing the events of 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
took emergency measures to merge LTCM into its Wall Street counterpar-
ties because of its perceived status as Too-Big-to-Fail.51
The institutional innovation that took place in response to these crises
came to be seen as a fundamental renovation of the old Bretton Woods
regime, and was dubbed the “New International Financial Architecture”
(NIFA).52 In contrast to Bretton Woods, the NIFA did not consist exclu-
sively of a handful of treaty-based international organizations. Instead, a
complex flora and fauna of informal state-to-state bodies, transgovern-
mental networks, and private industry organizations arose, all with varying
aims and degrees of legalization.53 The intellectual consensus underlying
the NIFA was that, although developed economies had essentially sound
financial systems, developing countries had dysfunctional and improperly
regulated banking sectors that needed to be reformed to resemble their
more advanced counterparts.54
46. KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 34, at 125–26, 162. Speculation quickly
moved to Argentina and Brazil, which suffered speculative runs on their currencies as well.
Id., at 125–26.
47. See Aaron Tornell, Common Fundamentals in the Tequila and Asian Crisis, (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7139, 1999).
48. See id. at 2–4; KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 34, at 140–41.
49. KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 34, at 140–41.
50. LTCM pursued a bond arbitrage strategy based on complex mathematical models
developed by its Nobel Prize winning founders, but the strategy blew up after Russia’s entan-
glement in the Asian crisis led to its default on sovereign debt and an unexpected divergence
in U.S. and European bond prices. See generally, ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS
FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 144, 234 (2001).
51. Tyler Cowen, Bailout of Long-Term Capital: A Bad Precedent?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
26, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/28/business/economy/28view.html
(identifying parallels between LTCM and the 2008 Crisis).
52. See Camdessus, supra note 5; Rubin, supra note 5.
53. See Barry Eichengreen, Reforming the International Financial Architecture, 2011
Edition, Keynote Address Before the Annual Research Conference of the Bank of Korea,
Seoul 1, May 26, 2011 (transcript available through University of California, Berkeley).
54. See Camdessus, supra note 5, at 2 (listing three factors leading to the Asian crisis:
“weakness of their public and private banking and financial structures; an unsustainable ac-
cumulation of short-term financing . . . and . . . deep-seated problems of governance, corrup-
tion, and what U.S. commentators call ‘crony capitalism.’”); id., at 3-4 (citing as a “building
block” of the NIFA, “a set of standards and codes of best practices . . . . Our challenge today
is to disseminate these good practices in emerging markets.”); Eichengreen, supra note 53, at
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An important institutional innovation of the NIFA was the emergence
of the Group of 7 (the G7, later the G8), an informal state-to-state forum
where heads of government of the seven largest economies met annually.
Mainly thought of as a mere talking shop in its earlier incarnations, the G8
took more affirmative steps to facilitate the process of developing global
standards for financial regulation after the 1990s crises.55 In direct re-
sponse to the Asian crisis, the G7/8 created the Financial Stability Forum
(FSF), which developed a set of core principles that define best practices
for financial regulators and also coordinated similar projects under the
auspices of transgovernmental regulatory networks and treaty-based inter-
national organizations such as the IMF.56
Along with the G7/8, transgovernmental networks of regulators be-
came an active and important part of the NIFA. The Basel Committee
updated its Basel Accords on capital adequacy with a more sophisticated
Basel II agreement, formally adopted in 2004 and gradually implemented
by member states thereafter.57 IOSCO also accelerated its efforts, formu-
lating a standard form for disclosures in cross-border securities listings in
1998, establishing a permanent secretariat in Madrid in 1999, and conclud-
ing an information-sharing agreement in 2002, known as the Multilateral
Memorandum of Understanding.58 Though less prominent than the other
two networks, the IAIS also heightened its presence by contributing a set
of solvency principles for insurance companies in 2007.59
Private industry bodies also took a new and more aggressive role at
harmonizing national regulatory practices.60 The International Accounting
2; Stanley Fischer, Economic Crises and the Financial Sector, Speech at Conference on De-
posit Insurance ¶7 (Dec. 10, 1998) (transcript available through the IMF).
55. The G7 became the G8 with the inclusion of Russia in 1998. A more inclusive G20
was established in September 1999, but initially served as a fairly marginal complement to the
G8. See Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global Financial Crisis and the Finan-
cial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International Financial Regulation, 32
U.N.S.W. L.J. 488, 489, 492–93 (2009); David Zaring, International Institutional Performance
in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 494–96 (2010) [hereinafter Institutional Performance].
56. See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND CODES TO
STRENGTHEN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (2001) [hereinafter FSF STANDARDS]. See, e.g., INT’L
ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS. [IOSCO], OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULA-
TION (2003) [hereinafter IOSCO SECURITIES REGULATION PRINCIPLES]; ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004)
[hereinafter OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES].
57. See BASEL II, supra note 1.
58. IOSCO, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING CON-
SULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2002) [hereinafter
IOSCO MMOU].
59. IAIS, THE IAIS COMMON STRUCTURE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF INSURER SOL-
VENCY (2007) [hereinafter IAIS SOLVENCY PRINCIPLES].
60. See generally, Walter Mattli & Time Büthe, Setting International Standards: Tech-
nological Rationality or Primacy of Power, 56 WORLD POLITICS 1 (2003) (analyzing the rise
of private standard-setting organizations beginning in the 1990s); TIM BÜTHE & WALTER
MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY, 60–126 (2011) (same).
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Standards Board (IASB) became the successor organization to the IASC
in 2001 and created a set of standards known as the International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS).61 In 2002, the ISDA updated its over-the-
counter derivatives codes with the Second Edition of its Master Agree-
ment. A number of other significant industry associations formed during
this period as well.62
The last major institutional piece of the NIFA was the IMF, a formal,
treaty-based international organization. The IMF’s most prominent role
was as an international lender of last resort, supplying emergency loans to
countries experiencing balance of payments crises, including Mexico, Rus-
sia, Argentina, and several East Asian countries.63 The IMF also took the
lead under the NIFA in providing “surveillance” of the international fi-
nancial system.64 IMF surveillance consisted of Financial Sector Assess-
ment Programs (FSAPs), which monitored implementation of the best
practices standards formulated by the transgovernmental networks.65 The
IMF also provided broader supervision of the global macroeconomy
through its semi-annual Global Financial Stability Reports.66
D. The 2008 Financial Crisis
The NIFA presided over a period of relative stability in global finance
from 2001 to 2007 and, at the time was, widely considered a success.67 But
the illusion that a large financial crisis could only happen in developing
economies with defective, “crony” banking systems was shattered in
2008.68 The proximate cause of the 2008 Crisis was a precipitous drop in
61. IAIS, INT’L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS [IFRS]: AN AICPA BACKGROUNDER
app. 10.11 (2011) (showing the timeline of the IASC and the IFRS); About the IASB, IFRS,
available at http://www.ifrs.com/updates/iasb/ about_the_iasb.html.
62. For example, the Bond Market Association (BMA), which merged into the Securi-
ties Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) in 2006, and the European-based
International Capital Market Association (ICMA). See Hal S. Scott, An Overview of Interna-
tional Finance: Law and Regulation, RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW, 361, 370 (Andrew T. Guzman & Allen O. Sykes eds., 2008).
63. KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 34, at 208, 245, 248–49, 292–93; see gener-
ally, James M. Boughton, From Suez to Tequila: The IMF as Crisis Manager, 110 THE ECON.
J. 273 (2000).
64. See Institutional Performance, supra note 55, at 490.
65. The output of FSAPs were reports known as ROSCs (Reports on Observance of
Standards and Codes), which evaluated the implementation of standards and codes devel-
oped by the FSF and other networks.
66. The IMF began to issue its Global Financial Stability Reports in 2002. See generally
Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borenszstein, & Catherine Pattillo, Assessing Early Warning Sys-
tems: How Have They Worked in Practice?, IMF Staff Papers 462 2005 (describing early
warning system (EWS) models and how they can be used to determine a country’s financial
vulnerability).
67. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits,
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 137 (2007).
68. See Barry Eichengreen, Reforming the International Financial Architecture After
Ten Years: The View From Emerging Markets, Speech at the Tokyo Club Foundation for
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housing prices across the United States69 and Europe,70 beginning in
2006.71 Because homebuyers and mortgage originators did not anticipate
such a severe drop in housing prices, defaults on mortgages rapidly in-
creased.72 Losses in the housing market were transmitted through the fi-
nancial system with the practice of securitization, which allowed for the
creation and sale of financial instruments, the value of which depended on
the viability of residential mortgages.73
Large financial institutions also assigned a very low probability to the
chance that housing prices would substantially and rapidly decline, and as
a result, they underestimated the risks of securitized products such as resi-
dential mortgage-nacked securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obli-
gations (CDOs).74 Failure to appreciate the risks involved in housing-
related securities led the banks and government sponsored enterprises
that held these instruments as assets to finance their operations with large
amounts of short-term debt;75 they were overleveraged. As the value of
housing-related securities dropped, the cost of financial institutions’ short-
Global Studies Conference: The Global Monetary and Financial System and its Governance
(Nov. 11, 2008), in MACRO ECON. PROC., Feb. 2009, at 1–2.
69. U.S. housing prices fell 30 percent in less than three years, and the stock of US
housing wealth is estimated to have declined by approximately $15 trillion over a similar
period. Robert M. Solow, How to Understand the Disaster, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 14, 2009,
at 4 (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009)).
70. Equal or greater fluctuations in housing prices occurred in several European coun-
tries, including Ireland, Spain, Belgium, and France. Paul Hilbers et al., House Price Develop-
ments in Europe: A Comparison 12–13 (IMF, Working Paper WP/08/2011, 2008) (providing a
comparison across European countries and noting that the fall in U.S. housing prices would
put it at the mid-range of European housing price fluctuations).
71. Cf. Robert E. Hall, Why Does the Economy Fall to Pieces After a Financial Crisis?,
24 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2010); Edward E. Leamer, The Housing Is the Business Cycle, Presen-
tation at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium: Housing, Housing Finance
and Monetary Policy (Oct. 11, 2007) in ECON. SYMP. CONF. PROC., 2007, at 149.
72. Many homeowners were vulnerable to the collapse in housing prices because they
had taken out mortgages based on the widespread expectation that prices would continue to
rise or would at least not fall very much. Mortgage lenders on the other side shared similar
expectations. See Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher S. Gerardi, & Paul S. Willen, Why Did So
Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis
36–39 (Fed. Reserve of Boston, Pub. Pol’y Discussion Paper No. 12-2, 2012.
73. The markets for these financial instruments were large and global. See MCKINSEY
GLOBAL INST., MAPPING THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKET, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 12
(2007); Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Assoc’n, Statistics, SIFMA.ORG, http://www.sifma.org/re
search/statistics.aspx.
74. See Foote et al., supra note 72, at 13–15, 21–25, 56 fig. 9; Arnold Kling, The Finan-
cial Crisis: Moral Failure or Cognitive Failure?, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 508, 511 (2010).
75. Importantly, a large portion of this debt financing took place through the so-called
“shadow banking system,” in which repurchase agreements, asset-backed commercial paper,
and money market mutual funds were tapped on an extremely short-term basis, often over-
night. See generally Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking (Fed. Reserv. Bank of N.Y., Staff
Report No. 458, 2012) (providing an overview of the structure of the shadow banking sector).
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term financing shot up and they faced potential insolvency.76 In late 2008,
a trio of events—Lehman Brothers’s bankruptcy filing of Sunday Septem-
ber 15, the “breaking of the buck” by Lehman’s money market creditor
Reserve Primary Fund the following Monday, and the failure of AIG, also
on September 16—precipitated a generalized chaos in credit markets.77 In
response, the U.S. government announced its Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP) on October 3, which was quickly revised to entail directly
recapitalization of large U.S. financial institutions through government
purchases of several hundred billion dollars’ worth of senior preferred
stock and warrants.78
Fallout from the 2008 Crisis was not limited to individual firms. After
the near simultaneous collapse and emergency nationalization of its three
largest banks, Iceland was offered a $4.6 billion rescue package led by the
IMF on November 19, 2008.79 European countries that had premised their
macroeconomic and tax policies on financial gains from the housing
boom—including Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Italy—also exper-
ienced runs on their sovereign debt.80 Beginning in 2010, these indebted
European countries received emergency aid that was delivered jointly
through the “troika” of the IMF, European Commission, and European
Central Bank (ECB).81 In 2012, the ECB made a promise of unlimited
open market purchases of sovereign bonds, providing a temporary guaran-
tee that appears to have stemmed the rising tide of speculation on
76. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,
104 J. FIN. ECON. 425, 447–48 (2012). The number of major banks and other financial institu-
tions that failed or were rescued during the fall of 2008 remains startling to this day. A partial
list of well-known names includes: Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
IndyMac, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Royal
Bank of Scotland, Fortis, and Dexia.
77. The “TED Spread” between risk-free treasury bonds and inter-bank lending rose
to over 300 basis points on September 17. Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Sub-
prime to the Global Financial Crisis 4–7, 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16609, 2010).
78. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Buying Troubled Assets, 26 YALE J. REG. 343, 352–54
(2009). In the same month, the U.S. Federal Reserve also took the unusual step of tempora-
rily expanding its reciprocal swap lines with foreign central banks to allow greater access to
U.S. dollars. See Maurice Obstfeld, Lenders of Last Resort in a Globalized World, Keynote
Address at the 2009 International Conference, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies,
Bank of Japan, Tokyo 8–9 (May 27, 2009) (transcript available through University of Califor-
nia Berkeley).
79. Tasneem Brogger & Helga Kristin Einarsdottir, Iceland Gets $4.6 Billion Bailout
from IMF, Nordics, BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 20, 2008, 6:11 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=anS9Ze0bmXmM#share.
80. See Tyler Cowen, Is the Eurozone Crisis a Sovereign Fiscal Crisis?,
MARGINALREVOLUTION.COM (Sept. 19, 2011, 12:37 PM) (characterizing the fiscal strategies
of European countries as analogous to selling a naked put option), http://marginalrevolution
.com/marginalrevolution/2011/09/is-the-eurozone-crisis-a-sovereign-fiscal-crisis-2.html; see
also Matthew C. Turk, Implications of European Disintegration for International Law, 17
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 395, 413–15 (2011) (providing a similar argument).
81. Less Cash, More Impact, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2012.
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Eurozone debt while leaving the medium-term future of the European
Monetary Union unresolved.82
During the 2008 Crisis, the G20 supplanted the G7/8 of the NIFA.83
The G20 convened on an accelerated schedule and coordinated the inter-
national crisis management agenda by issuing a series of “Communiqués,”
declaring its members’ commitments to stimulative fiscal and monetary
policies, free trade, and comprehensive financial regulatory reform on
both a domestic and coordinated, international basis.84 As with the G7/8,
the G20 also worked towards post-crisis institutional development, partic-
ularly by establishing the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as a broader-
based successor to the FSF.85
With the G20 taking the lead, many of the high profile networks of the
NIFA were sidelined from any crisis management role.86 However, new
measures aimed at crisis prevention eventually did take shape and were
coordinated through networks of regulators under the auspices of the
FSB. Among the more prominent projects was the Basel Committee’s de-
velopment of a third version of its capital adequacy accord, Basel III,
adopted by the G20 in 2010.87 The FSB also began to implement its ex-
panded mandate, which includes a new mandatory process for peer-review
of members’ compliance with international financial codes and
standards.88
Despite the admittedly substantial regulatory activity and institutional
development in response to the 2008 Crisis, it was not a watershed in the
82. See Claire Jones & Michael Steel, Draghi Outlines Bond Buying Plan, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 6, 2012) (quoting ECB chairman Mario Draghi’s promise to do “whatever it takes” to
save the euro), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/448a6f28-f822-11e1-828f-00144feabdc0.html#ax
zz3BhAkUdzF.
83. Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of the International Financial Architecture After the
Global Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 81, 90 (2009) (“[At] the international level, the
approach chosen was to revive the G-20 . . . which had been more or less dormant since its
inception in 1999, and to establish it as the main forum for reforming the international finan-
cial architecture.”); Institutional Performance, supra note 55, at 485–86, 496–503.
84. While the G/78 met annually, the G20 met every six months from 2008–2011. See
Arie C. Eernisse, Banking on Cooperation: The Role of the G-20 in Improving the Interna-
tional Financial Architecture, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L 239, 241, 242–45 (2012).
85. The FSB expanded on the membership of the FSF by including those G20 coun-
tries not among the G8. See Financial Stability Board Charter, Annex A, Sept. 25, 2009;
Communique, Group of Twenty, London Summit–Leaders’ Statement ¶¶ 13–21 (Apr. 2,
2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf. See generally Arner
& Taylor, supra note 55.
86. See Institutional Performance, supra note 55, at 478 (admitting that “international
networks, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organ-
ization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), have not been the loci of any serious response to
the crisis.”).
87. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL
III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING
SYSTEMS (Dec. 2010) [hereinafter BASEL III], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128
.pdf; The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, ¶¶ 27–33 (Nov. 11-12, 2010), available at
http://www.g20. org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf.
88. See Arner & Taylor, supra note 56, at 497–98.
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evolution of the international financial architecture that some observers
predicted or hoped for: there was no grand Bretton Woods II bargain.89
Instead, a NIFA 2.0 emerged, as existing institutions of the original NIFA
became more active, expanded their membership or mandates at the mar-
gins, and began to busily prepare the next generation of best practices
standards for financial regulation.90 This marginal expansion of the previ-
ous regulatory framework, which itself was not particularly successful,
must grapple with a global financial system that has not seen its fifty-year
trends of turbulent expansion and integration reversed by the 2008 Cri-
sis.91 In addition to an unforgiving economic environment, the latest ver-
sion of the NIFA must also operate in an increasingly multipolar and
fragmented international political context due to the relative economic de-
cline of the United States and EU92 Whether the new reforms have made
the international financial architecture better prepared to meet the daunt-
ing demands of post-2008 global finance is the subject of Section II.
II. INTERDEPENDENCE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION
The preceding Section attempted to provide a historical perspective to
the international financial system and to sketch its complexity: the crazy-
quilt of international regulatory institutions, dynamism of international fi-
nancial integration, and variety of financial crises. Following an approach
common in political science and economic analyses of international law
and international relations, this Section aims to reduce this factual com-
plexity by identifying and analyzing the fundamental interdependence
problems created by global finance.93 An interdependence problem exists
89. See Editorial, Still Lost in the Old Bretton Woods, FIN. TIMES, Dec.28, 2009 at 8
(“[E]ven after the worst financial and economic shock since the Depression, and much grand
talk of a new Bretton Woods, little reform has happened . . . The crisis has not produced a
new world order.”).
90. See Joseph Norton, Comment on the Developing Transnational Network(s) in the
Area of International Financial Regulation: The Underpinnings of a New Bretton Woods II
Global Financial System Framework, 43 INT’L L. 179, 191 (2009) (“NIFA-I did produce virtu-
ally all the important components for building NIFA-II.”).
91. See IMF, THE REFORM AGENDA, AN INTERIM REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A
SAFER FINANCIAL SYSTEM 103, Oct. 2012 (summarizing the relevant statistics and concluding
that, “In general, up until 2011, the crisis had not reversed the long-term trend of globaliza-
tion even though some selected areas have suffered. There is currently no evidence of a
generalized move toward de-globalization.”).
92. See Ian Bremmer & Nouriel Roubini, A G-Zero World: The New Economic Club
Will Produce Conflict, Not Cooperation, FOREIGN AFF., at 1, Jan. 31, 2011 at 2 (“We are now
living in a G-Zero world, one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political
and economic leverage—or the will—to drive a truly international agenda. The result will be
intensified conflict on the international stage over vitally important issues, such as interna-
tional macroeconomic coordination, financial regulatory reform, trade policy, and climate
change.”); DREZNER, supra note 7, at 218 (“[T]he scope of regulatory coordination is nega-
tively correlated with the number of major economic powers in the system.”).
93. See Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 8, at 17 (“[T]he tenor of recent political sci-
ence research has been to look at the underlying characteristics of the problems—rather than
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when the actions of one state produce positive or negative spillovers af-
fecting the welfare of other states. In these instances, a rational, self-inter-
ested state will act in accordance with a private cost-benefit calculation
that diverges from the same analysis if done on a global scale. Interdepen-
dence problems therefore present opportunities for states to develop co-
operative arrangements that discourage negative spillovers or encourage
positive spillovers in ways that can benefit all parties involved.94 Accord-
ingly, identifying the interdependence problems of cross-border finance is
the best starting point for understanding the domain over which interna-
tional financial regulation can potentially be useful.
The standard game theoretic distinction between problems of “coordi-
nation” and “cooperation” is a helpful starting point for determining the
degree to which a particular interdependence problem is amenable to ef-
fective international regulation.95 In coordination games, parties receive a
higher payoff by adopting a common strategy rather than acting unilater-
ally.96 As a result, resolution of coordination problems tends to be self-
enforcing, because negotiating parties benefit from complying with the
terms of the bargain after it is made, and conflict is limited to the relative
distribution of the bargain’s benefits.97 In cooperation games, most fa-
mously the prisoner’s dilemma, the collective payoff is also greatest when
all parties choose a common cooperative strategy. But in contrast to coor-
dination games, each party in a cooperation game receives a superior pay-
off if it chooses not to cooperate or reneges on its commitments after the
fact.98 Cooperation problems are thus not normally self-enforcing, as the
conflict between individual and collective payoffs can cause cooperation to
unravel. At the same time, cooperation games do not inevitably lead to
inefficient outcomes.99 It is possible for parties to maintain a cooperative
equilibrium under certain conditions, depending on the parties’ numer-
the issue-area—that define possibility, content and results of cooperation. We call these char-
acteristics the ‘type of problem.’”).
94. See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 6, at 17 (“[T]he gains from international coopera-
tion arise primarily from the fact that actions in or by one state have implications for the
well-being of citizens in other states. In such settings, we will say that actions create an inter-
national externality.”).
95. See generally, Snidal, supra note 11.
96. See BAIRD, supra note 12, at 41–43 (explaining coordination games); JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33–35 (2005) (discuss-
ing coordination games specifically in the context of international law); see also Richard Mc-
Adams, Beyond the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 82 U.S.C. L. REV. 209 (2009) (arguing for the
prevalence of coordination games in law); THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CON-
FLICT 134 (1960) (explaining that every cooperation problem entails a question of coordina-
tion regarding the form that cooperation should take).
97. Cf. Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1980)
(providing the seminal theoretical account of self-enforcing agreements).
98. See BAIRD, supra note 12, at 31–35 (explaining prisoner’s dilemma games); GOLD-
SMITH & POSNER, supra note 96, at 87 (same, in the context of international law).
99. Cf. Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley, Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Col-
lective Action, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 869 (2001) (analyzing the conditions that give rise to coopera-
tive equilibria); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (rev. ed. 1984)
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osity, patience, regularity of interaction, and ease of monitoring and pun-
ishing non-cooperative behavior.100
This Section uses the above framework to delineate the most funda-
mental interdependence problems of cross-border finance and evaluate
the international financial architecture’s prospects for effectively dealing
with them. As mentioned at the outset, the interconnection of domestic
financial markets creates a dual role for cooperation on international regu-
latory policy: maximizing gains from trade in international finance and
minimizing the losses that arise in the form of financial instability. Efforts
to mitigate the losses from financial instability can be further subdivided
into ex ante regulation aimed at crisis prevention, and ex post crisis man-
agement interventions. These basic categories give rise to four specific in-
terdependence problems: (1) harmonizing financial standards to lower the
cost of cross-border transactions and increase the efficiency of financial
integration; (2) maintaining the capital adequacy of financial institutions
across jurisdictions to prevent crises ex ante; and, managing crises ex post
by (3) establishing a cross-border resolution mechanism to unwind failed
firms, and by (4) implementing an international lender-of-last-resort func-
tion to intervene in sovereign debt or currency crises.
In general, the discussion below concludes that states will be able to
develop an international financial architecture that is capable of solving
coordination problems, such as the harmonization of standards to facilitate
financial integration. At the same time, states will continue to struggle
with regulatory projects that seek to enhance the stability of the global
financial system, all of which imply problems of cooperation that are not
easily overcome. Section III then explores the policy implications of this
analysis, and argues that progress can be made on otherwise intractable
cooperation problems by scaling cooperation to the regional level, or by
focusing on coordination problems embedded within more complex coop-
erative efforts to provide stability.
A. Harmonization of Standards
1. Defining the Interdependence Problem
“Harmonization of standards” is a phrase that is sometimes used quite
broadly in the literature.101 At times, it refers to any agreement upon com-
(same); SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL PUBLIC
GOODS (2010) (same).
100. See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 6, at 27–36.
101. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 17, at 2 (using the phrase to cover nearly all interna-
tional cooperation on financial regulation); David E. van Zandt, The Regulatory and Institu-
tional Conditions for an International Securities Market, 32 VA. J. INT’L L. 47, 72 (1991)
(referring to standards in the securities fraud context in writing that “[some] regulatory dif-
ferences . . . reflect different governmental judgments about the social dangers or costs of the
operation of unfettered securities markets.”); see also Alan O. Sykes, Regulatory Competition
or Regulatory Harmonization? A Silly Question?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 254 (2000) (providing a
taxonomy of the forms of “standards” used in the literature). Under Sykes’s taxonomy, capi-
tal requirements or securities fraud efforts would include coordination through “minimum
standards” or “agreement on non-homogeneous regulatory targets.” Id. at 259.
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mon substantive regulations—including those such as capital requirements
or prohibitions against securities fraud—that are intended to restrain so-
cially wasteful forms of profit-seeking behavior by firms or to contribute
to greater financial stability.102 This usage therefore equates all regula-
tions with “standards.” In a different but also broad sense, the label is
applied to the many codes of best practices or “principles” that interna-
tional bodies formulate and urge members to implement.103 Although
sometimes touted in the literature as substantive “legislative achieve-
ments,” these documents are essentially hortatory and consist of provi-
sions that are too abstract to serve as practical regulatory guidance.104
Thus, it is dubious whether the principles documents result in any actual
convergence or harmonization of regulatory practices.105
However, understood more narrowly, harmonization of standards is
about agreements on rules governing the form (rather than substance) that
cross-border financial transactions or disclosures must take. When regula-
tory standards diverge across national jurisdictions, the cost of a cross-
border transaction may exceed that of an otherwise economically identical
domestic transaction because of the need to comply with two different sets
of rules. The result is a distortion of the decision to allocate capital, draw-
ing resources from more efficient to less efficient uses. Bringing domestic
regulations into conformity through agreements on common international
standards, or agreeing to mutual recognition of domestic standards,106 can
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY FORUM [FSF], PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND COMPENSATION
PRACTICES (2009) [hereinafter FSF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES]; BASEL CON-
CORDAT, supra note 36; FSF STANDARDS, supra note 56; OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PRINCIPLES, supra note 56; IOSCO SECURITIES REGULATION PRINCIPLES, supra note 56;
IAIS SOLVENCY PRINCIPLES, supra note 59.
104. Compare How International Financial Law Works, supra note 9, at 278–79 (refer-
ring to these documents as “legislation” and “legislative achievements”) with DREZNER,
supra note 7, at 81–85 (referring to these documents somewhat derogatorily as “sham
standards”).
105. A few representative examples confirm Drezner’s “sham standards” view: most
provisions in principles documents amount to vague platitudes. See e.g., FSF, EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES, supra note 12, at Nos. 1, 7 (“1. The firm’s board of directors
must actively oversee the compensation system’s design and operation . . . 7. The mix of cash,
equity and other forms of compensation must be consistent with risk alignment.”); IOSCO
SECURITIES REGULATION PRINCIPLES, supra note 56, No. 6.1. (6.1.1: “The responsibilities of
the regulator should be clear and objectively stated”; . . . 6.1.4: “The regulator should adopt
clear and consistent regulatory processes”; . . . 6.1.5: “The staff of the regulator should ob-
serve the highest professional standards, including appropriate standards of
confidentiality.”).
106. States can either decide to impose an identical regulatory standard, or achieve a
functionally similar result through agreements to mutually recognize standards when they
diverge. For example if Jurisdiction A requires pleadings printed on blue paper, and Jurisdic-
tion B requires pleadings on red paper, an agreement to recognize each other’s requirements
in effect creates a single, common standard: “pleadings must be printed on red or blue pa-
per.” Both forms of convergence can be considered steps towards regulatory harmonization.
See Alan O. Sykes, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods
and Service Markets, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49 (1999) (arguing that mutual recognition is often a
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therefore reduce transaction costs and facilitate cross-border exchange.107
By broadening the relevant market, common standards may also allow
firms to take greater advantage of economies of scale.108 Thus, harmoniza-
tion of standards potentially facilitates international financial integration
and makes global financial markets more efficient.
Agreement on common standards will be easiest to achieve when har-
monization takes the form of a pure coordination game, in which states do
not have divergent preferences over which standard is used, as long as
some common standard is chosen.109 However, although negotiations over
common standards do not typically involve widely differing assessments of
optimal policy or direct conflicts of interest among the parties, disagree-
ment may often arise because states will prefer that a common standard
take the form that is least costly for their domestic industries to adopt.
Negotiating parties’ concerns over the relative distribution of these
“switching costs,”110 means that harmonization of financial standards will
not be a pure coordination game, but instead is best modeled as a “battle-
of-the-sexes” coordination game.111 In a battle-of-the-sexes game, coordi-
superior policy to convergence on a single, common standard). But see Eric A. Posner, The
Questionable Basis of the Common European Sales Law: The Role of an Optional Instrument
in Jurisdictional Competition, 50 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 261, 264, 267–69 (2013) (cau-
tioning that creating a new, optional international standard while also preserving divergent
domestic standards may only add complexity and increase transaction costs).
107. See DREZNER, supra note 7, at 43 (“Regulatory coordination reduces the transac-
tion costs of cross-border exchange, leading to an increase in static efficiency, which increases
economic benefits for all participating states.”).
108. See id. (“There is reason to believe that regulatory coordination leads to dynamic
gains from trade as well . . . If one allows for increasing returns to scale.”); cf. Charles P.
Kindleberger, Standards as Public, Collective, and Private Goods, 36 KYKLOS 377 (1983) (em-
phasizing the importance of economies of scale for the production of standards).
109. See McAdams, supra note 96, at 219 n.33.
110. See DREZNER, supra note 7, at 46 (referring to switching costs as the “costs of
coordination”); Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of
Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589, 601 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of the
preferences of the United States during the 1990s); Elliot Posner, Making Rules for Global
Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium, 63 INT’L ORG.
665, 666, 670–76 (2009) (emphasizing the same with regard to jockeying between the United
States and European Union).
111. See BAIRD, supra note 12, at 41–43 (explaining battle of sexes games); GOLDSMITH
& POSNER, supra note 96, at 32–35 (discussing battle of the sexes games specifically in the
context of international law). The name is derived from a hypothetical married couple that
must decide whether to spend their evening going to the ballet, going to a sports event, or
staying at home. The husband and wife each prefer the gender-stereotypical event, but both
prefer attending either event together compared to not going out at all. A two-player, one
period battle of the sexes game can be represented as follows:
Column (Husband): Ballet Basketball
Row (Wife): Ballet (4, 1) (0,0)
Basketball (0,0) (1, 4)
Fall 2014] Reframing International Financial Regulation 81
nation on a common standard benefits all parties, but preferences diverge
over what form the standard should take.112
Coordination games, including battle-of-the-sexes games, have multi-
ple equilibria, meaning that parties may converge on one of multiple strat-
egies, or a mix of strategies.113 Whether parties can bargain towards a
common equilibrium114 depends on a variety of factors, including the par-
ties’ switching costs, and whether one party can make its preferred equilib-
rium focal by acting as a first-mover or leveraging other forms of
bargaining power.115 However, after the bargaining phase in which a com-
mon standard has been agreed upon, parties benefit from continuously
adhering to that standard and do not face a strong incentive to defect dur-
ing the compliance phase.116 Taking these considerations together, the
prediction yielded by this model is that international agreements to har-
monize financial standards will be forthcoming, although not inevitable,
and that once an agreement is made lack of compliance should not be a
critical issue.
2. Evaluating Harmonization of Standards
The historical experience is consistent with the basic game theoretic
analysis above, and indicates that harmonization of financial standards is a
relatively tractable problem of international regulatory cooperation on fi-
nance. Many of the international standard-setting bodies were formed or
gained momentum during the NIFA period, and deeper harmonization is
the main success of the NIFA.117 And going forward, increasing global
capital flows will provide momentum for further harmonization efforts,
because the volume of international financial transactions corresponds
112. See McAdams, supra note 96, at 222 (“The [battle of sexes] game also models
standard setting, as where different firms or industries need to agree to certain technical
standards to allow their products to interact.”); Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of Boiler-
plate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (2005) (analyzing boilerplate—a form of contractual standardi-
zation—as a battle of the sexes game); Mattli & Büthe, supra note 60, at 10; Stephen D.
Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43
WORLD POL. 336 (1991).
113. See McAdams, supra note 96, at 212. As a simple example, in a coordination game
concerning rules of the road, a convention of driving on either the left or right side of the
road are both equilibrium results.
114. Because real world negotiation takes place over time, a single period battle-of-the-
sexes matrix can be understood as the final period of an ongoing, multiple-period Rubinstein
bargaining game in which the passage of time without agreement imposes a cost on both
parties. See id., at 236–37; BAIRD, supra note 12, at 219–41; Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilib-
rium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97 (1982).
115. See DREZNER, supra note 7, at 51–55; SCHELLING, supra note 96, at 67–74; Ahdieh,
supra note 112, at 1039–41; Maarten C.W. Janssen, On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in
Bargaining Situations, 27 J. ECON. PSYCH. 622 (2006).
116. See James D. Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52
INT’L ORG. 269, 276–79 (1998) (arguing that international cooperation is best analyzed as
including distinct “bargaining” and “enforcement” phases).
117. See infra Section I.C.
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with returns to investment in reducing transaction costs.118 For these rea-
sons, there is cause for optimism regarding post-2008 cooperation on har-
monization of financial standards.
A variety of organizations and institutional forms have facilitated the
harmonization of international financial standards, including private in-
dustry groups, networks of government regulators, and international orga-
nizations. At the same time, most standard setting is best understood as
ultimately state-directed, with states delegating the process of drafting
technical specifications to private trade organizations or networks of regu-
lators.119 The regulatory documents produced by these entities are then
subject to legislative approval and adoption by governments, which retain
control over the substantive outcomes of the process. Many of the cases
described below resemble public-private partnerships in this respect.
One example of harmonization led by a private industry group is the
work of the International Swaps & Derivatives Association, Inc.
(ISDA),120 which was formed in 1985 with the mission of standardizing
aspects of the markets for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.121 The or-
ganization’s primary achievement is the ISDA Master Agreement, first pro-
duced in 1992 with an updated version appearing in 2002, which provides
standardized form contracts for transactions in OTC derivatives.122 By de-
veloping widely used form contracts, the Master Agreement serves to mini-
mize the costs of transacting in OTC derivatives and also helps to reduce
counterparty risk.123 Another ISDA initiative has been to formulate
model laws on the netting and collateralization of OTC derivative transac-
tions, which can then be given effect through domestic legislation.124 The
ISDA’s Model Netting Acts have been widely adopted, and one commen-
tator has gone so far as to state that, “the widespread adoption of the
ISDA model laws is probably the most successful international harmoniza-
tion achievement over the last two decades.”125
118. See DREZNER, supra note 7, at 32 (“Economic globalization increases the gross
rewards to policy coordination.”).
119. Id., at 73–74 (arguing that the state-delegation model applies).
120. See About ISDA, supra note 44.
121. OTC derivative are financial instruments that are traded informally between par-
ties rather than on any central exchange, such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange or New
York Stock Exchange.
122. INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N [ISDA], ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (1992);
ISDA, 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT (2002).
123. See generally Ahdieh, supra note 112 (analyzing the various uses and benefits of
standard forms).
124. The original 1996 Model Netting Act has been updated twice, most recently in
2006. See ISDA, 2006 MODEL NETTING ACT AND MEMORANDUM ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF NETTING LEGISLATION: A GUIDE FOR LEGISLATORS AND OTHER POLICY-MAKERS
(2006), available at http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/legal-and-documentation/opinions/.
125. Richard J. Herring, The Central Role of Resolution Policy in Dealing with Systemi-
cally Important Financial institutions 42 (May 29, 2011) (unpublished paper), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/11/11-71.pdf.
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Another area seemingly ripe for harmonization of standards is ac-
counting. Accounting is essentially an exercise in measurement (of assets
and liabilities) and standardization of measures is a classic area of harmo-
nization.126 If multinational financial institutions can function under a sin-
gle set of global accounting principles regardless of the geographic
location of their operations, the cost of complying with multiple domestic
standards would be avoided.127 Harmonization of accounting standards
has been led by another private organization, the International Account-
ing Standards Board (IASB), which has been pursuing the goal for de-
cades with some success.128 The IASB’s main project has been to
formulate a set of “principle-based” accounting standards, known as the
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).129 Harmonization of
accounting coordinated around IFRS standards has made steady progress,
beginning with the adoption of IFRS by the EU in 2005. In 2007, the SEC
issued a Final Rule allowing foreign issuers to use IFRS accounting as an
alternative to the previously required GAAP standard.130 The U.K. is cur-
rently working to implement the IFRS in some form as well.131
Transgovernmental networks of regulators have also made progress at
harmonization, notably IOSCO. One harmonization effort of IOSCO,
completed in 1998, was to develop a standard non-financial disclosure doc-
ument for firms to provide to securities regulators, with the aim of reduc-
ing the cost of cross-border offerings and listings.132 Standardization of
securities disclosures based on IOSCO’s form disclosure has been wide-
spread.133 The SEC revised its disclosure requirements to harmonize with
the IOSCO in 1999, and the U.K. and EU took similar steps thereafter.134
126. See Kindleberger, supra note 108, at 378–79; Hendrik Spruyt, The Supply and De-
mand of Governance in Standard-Setting: Insights from the Past, 8 J. EURO. PUB. POL’Y 371,
377–89 (2001).
127. See Clyde Stoltenberg et al., The Past Decade of Regulatory Change in U.S. and
EU Capital Market Regimes: An Evolution from National Interests toward International Har-
monization with Emerging G-20 Leadership, 29 BERK. J. INT’L L. 578, 601–02, 637 (2011);
Christopher S. Armstrong et al., Market Reaction to the Adoption of IFRS in Europe 29–30
(Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 09-032, 2008) (quantitative study finding that investors
in European firms perceived net benefits associated with accounting harmonization).
128. See IAIS, supra 61.
129. See id.
130. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240 & 249 (2010); Exchange Act Release Nos.
33-8831 & 34-56217 (Aug. 7, 2007); Marie Leone, IFRS Returns to the Front Burner, CFO
.COM (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/14445960.
131. See ERNST & YOUNG, UK GAAP V. IFRS: THE BASICS 1 (2011), available at http:/
/www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/UK_GAAP_v_IFRS_-_The_basics_-_Spring_2011/
$FILE/EY_UK_GAAP_vs_IFRS_-_The%20basics_-_Spring_2011%20.pdf.
132. Communique, IOSCO, Final Communique of the 23rd Annual Conference of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (Sept. 18, 1998), available at http://
www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS44-English.pdf.
133. See generally, Samuel Wolff, Implementation of International Disclosure Standards,
22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 91, (2001).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-mm (1994); International Disclosure Standards, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 33-7637, 1999 WL 44076 (S.E.C.) at *9 (Feb. 2, 1999).
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As the game theoretic analysis suggests, harmonization will not be
achievable in every context, particularly when the standards at issue re-
present substantive policy judgments, or when switching costs for powerful
states are high. An area illustrating the latter difficulty is insurance, where
coordination of standards has lagged. The International Association of In-
surance Supervisors (IAIS) is a transgovernmental network of insurance
regulators and the principal international body seeking to harmonize in-
surance standards.135 To date, however, the IAIS has yet to achieve much
concrete coordination of insurance regulation, and has only issued its high-
level IAIS Solvency Principles. Failure to make progress on more ambi-
tious efforts at convergence has in part been thwarted by the United
States, which is reluctant to enter into proposed agreements regarding in-
surance.136 Switching costs explain the United States’s lack of enthusiasm
in this area. There is no U.S. federal insurance law, and insurance is regu-
lated under various sets of rules determined at the state level.137 The cost
to the United States of switching to a new international standard is there-
fore a strong barrier to harmonization, as it would require renovating not
just one, but at least fifty separate insurance regimes.138
In summary, consistent with the battle-of-the-sexes model, states have
had considerable success in addressing the interdependence problem of
harmonizing standards, during both the NIFA and post-2008 periods. In
agreeing on common regulatory standards, states have been able to cap-
ture greater gains from international financial integration, by reducing the
cost of cross-border transactions and enabling multinational firms to take
advantage of economies of scale. That is not a trivial achievement. On the
other hand, perhaps unjustifiably, discussion of international financial reg-
ulation often centers on the “big” challenges that relate to reducing sys-
temic instability, rather than harmonization efforts that enhance the
efficiency of cross-border financial markets.
135. See About IAIS, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
136. See SINGER, supra note 17, at 96–114; Brown, supra note 45, at 969–70.
137. Dodd-Frank’s Title V makes a tentative first step towards federal insurance regula-
tion, by creating a Federal Insurance Office. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 502, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-
Frank]. However, substantive insurance regulation continues to be provided at the state level
pursuant to the McCarran Ferguson Act. See McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, ch. 20, 59 Stat.
33 (1945) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2000)).
138. See SINGER, supra note 17, at 113 (“[T]here is an important institutional barrier to
international harmonization in insurance that is not present in other financial industries: fifty
separate state regulators in the united states. Regulatory harmonization is not complete
within the country, and the international negotiating table is clearly not big enough for all
fifty regulators to have a unified voice.”); DREZNER, supra note 7, at 44 (referring to switch-
ing costs for domestic firms as the “costs of coordination”); Brown, supra note 45, at 972–88.
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B. Crisis Prevention: Maintaining Capital Adequacy
1. Defining the Interdependence Problem
As noted in this Article’s historical overview, the trend of interna-
tional financial market integration has been accompanied by an increasing
incidence of financial crises.
Not surprisingly, this has prompted international regulatory initiatives
aimed at mitigating systemic risks and promoting the stability of global
financial markets.139 Considered in the abstract, a stable cross-border fi-
nancial system resembles a global public good in the economic sense of the
term, and therefore would appear to provide an opportunity for states to
achieve mutual gains through collective action.140 Somewhat more con-
cretely, effective crisis prevention would require crafting and enforcing in-
ternational rules that restrain the financial risk-taking of sovereign states
and globally interconnected firms, so as to prevent the market disruptions
that would likely follow any default on their financial obligations. This
Part B focuses on the interdependence problem of crisis prevention with
respect to private financial institutions, while Part C.2 below considers the
issue from the perspective of sovereign debt and currency crises.
The essential feature of private sector financial stability is the solvency
of financial firms, which can be understood in a cash flow (ability to pay
139. “Systemic risk” and “financial stability” are amorphous concepts that can be de-
fined various ways. See, e.g. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, FIN. STABILITY BD. & INT’L
MONETARY FUND, REPORT TO G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND GOVERNORS—GUIDANCE TO
ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRU-
MENTS 2 (2009) (defining “systemic risk as a risk of disruption to financial services that is (i)
caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to
have serious negative consequences for the real economy”); Viral V. Acharya et al., Systemic
Risk and the Regulation of Insurance Companies, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE
DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 241, 261 (Viral V.
Acharya et al. eds., 2011) (“Systemic risk can be conceived as the potential failure of a signifi-
cant part of the financial sector—one large institution or many smaller ones—leading to re-
duction in the availability of credit and/or critical risk management products such as
insurance, thereby adversely affecting the real economy.”); see generally, Steven L. Schwarcz,
Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008).
140. See Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, Regulatory and Supervisory Independence
and Financial Stability 8 (IMF, Working Paper WP/02/46, 2002) (“[T]he achievement of fi-
nancial stability . . . is now generally considered a public good.”). A plausible case can be
made that systemic stability is both non-excludable and non-rivalrous, and therefore a pure
public good. However, it may be more accurate to consider international financial stability
closer to a common pool good, in which one state can “consume” the exhaustible resource of
stability at the expense of all others by allowing its financial sector to take on greater risk. See
Steven Schwarcz, supra note 139, at 206 (arguing that systemic risk arises from a “tragedy of
the commons” problem, implying that stability is non-excludable but has an element of
rivalrous consumption). Analogy can be made to the temperature of the earth’s atmosphere
as a common pool good, with a state’s carbon emissions constituting consumption of the
remaining space in the atmosphere for carbon-dioxide before climate change occurs. See gen-
erally, Gary Becker, What Should a Carbon Tax Look Like?, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG,
(July 7, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/what-should-a-carbon-
tax-look-like-becker.html. See also Matthew L. Beville, Financial Pollution: Systemic Risk
and Market Stability, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245 (2009).
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debts as they come due) or a balance sheet (owning assets in excess of
liabilities) sense. Preventing widespread bank failures in turn implies a
central role for capital adequacy.141 Financial institutions require capital in
order to gain access to credit and maintain a buffer sufficient to survive
substantial downward movements in asset prices or investor sentiment
without becoming insolvent.142 There is a wide variety of financial regula-
tions—relating to executive compensation, corporate governance, firm
size, or other regulatory targets besides capitalization143—but these mea-
sures will only contribute to the safety and soundness of banks to the ex-
tent that they indirectly serve to increase the capital cushion available to
absorb unexpected losses.144 Thus, with some simplification, the key regu-
latory mechanism for preventing crises ex ante is to require the robust
capitalization of large, globally connected financial firms. At the domestic
level, then, the need for capital adequacy creates a role for regulation.
This is because, although firms should in theory be indifferent to the
mix of debt and capital that is used to finance their operations, in practice,
foundational regulatory policies do not encourage financial firms to raise a
socially optimal ratio of capital to risk-adjusted assets.145 Specifically, a
141. See Alan Greenspan, The Crisis, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring
2010, at 201, 244 (“If capital is adequate, then, by definition, no financial institution will
default and serial contagion will be thwarted. Determining the proper level of risk-adjusted
capital should be the central focus of reform going forward.”); Andrei Schleifer, Comment on
Gorton and Metrick: Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPER ON ECON.
ACTIVITY, Fall 2010 at 298, 303 (“As long as market participants do not understand the risks
of the securities they are buying, whether these securities are ABSs or prime money market
fund shares or something that will be invented in the future, and see profit opportunities in
places where there are none, the financial system will adjust to meet their demand. One
implication of this is the standard point that providing the intermediaries with bigger cush-
ions of capital and liquidity is desirable.”).
142. Firms finance their operations through a mix of equity and debt. In banking regu-
lation, “capital” refers to equity, or equity-like forms of bank financing. “Regulatory capital”
refers to the minimum capital required by a regulator. “Economic capital” is defined as the
capital level that bank shareholders would choose in the absence of capital regulation. Abel
Elizalde & Rafael Repullo, Economic and Regulatory Capital in Banking: What is the Differ-
ence?, 3 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 87 (2007) (exploring the distinction in the context of Basel
Accord requirements); see also TARULLO, supra note 36, at 16–18.
143. See generally KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Princeton Univ. Press 2010) (providing an overview of many of
these as existing and proposed in reforms).
144. Many commentators also emphasize the importance of liquidity management to
systemic risk. This Article focuses on solvency because most capital requirements are now
accompanied by parallel liquidity provisions, and both sets of rules present regulatory
problems that are isomorphic. See Acharya et al., supra note 139, at 158–60 (noting that the
imposition of “liquidity requirements on financial institutions [is] similar in spirit to the way
that capital requirements are imposed” and that the “approach [to liquidity requirements has
been] eerily similar to that of Basel I, II, and III for setting capital requirements.”).
145. The Modigliani-Miller theorem—which holds that, under certain conditions, a
firm’s value is unaffected by the mix of debt and equity that is the source of its financing—
arguably does not apply to banking because certain regulatory and tax treatments particular
to banks make debt a more attractive source of financing than equity. Compare Franco Modi-
gliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of
Fall 2014] Reframing International Financial Regulation 87
portion of the debt of financial institutions is subject to regulations that
constitute explicit and/or implicit government guarantees. Explicit govern-
ment guarantees are provided through the FDIC’s insurance of bank de-
posits, as deposits are a form of debt that banks owe to depositors.146 The
government also implicitly guarantees the debts of banks and non-bank
financial institutions when acting as a lender of last resort through ad hoc
bailouts of firms deemed Too-Big-to-Fail. Government guarantees in fi-
nance, like any other form of insurance, create moral hazard and subsidize
risk taking by financial firms.147 Firms therefore react to both explicit and
implicit government insurance by holding less capital than would other-
wise be optimal in its absence, producing a need for regulators to impose
capital requirements.148
A rationale for international capital requirements also exists because
the domestically optimal level of capital for a state’s private financial sec-
tor to maintain is lower than the internationally optimal level. This inter-
national externality stems from the fact that the profits, jobs, tax revenue
and other benefits of a booming financial industry are concentrated lo-
cally, while a portion of the downside risk is systemic and borne by foreign
markets and counterparties.149 Even if it is assumed that the distribution
of costs and benefits from financial risk-taking falls evenly across states,
the IMF’s function as an international lender of last resort provides an
implicit form of insurance that leads to private investor moral hazard, in
the same manner that a national central bank subsidizes risk-taking by
bailing out Too-Big-to-Fail firms.150 Due to these dynamics, an interde-
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958) (providing the original articulation of the Modi-
gliani-Miller theorem), with Merton H. Miller, Do the M & M Propositions Apply to Banks?,
19 J. BANKING & FIN. 483 (1995) (analyzing the applicability of Modigliani-Miller to banks)
and TARULLO, supra note 36, at 16–18 (same).
146. After Dodd-Frank, the FDIC nominally covers only $250,000 in deposits. Dodd-
Frank, supra note 137, at § 335. However, innovations such as deposit syndication through
what is called “CDARS” (Certificate of Deposit Account Registry Service) allow for millions
of dollars in deposits to be insured. Sherril Shaffer, Reciprocal Brokered Deposits and Bank
Risk 1–2 (Ctr. Applied Macroecon. Analysis [CAMA], Working Paper No. 15/2010, 2010).
147. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Market Discipline and Deposit Insurance,
51 J. MONETARY ECON. 375, 392–96 (2004) (finding that banks that are subject to deposit
insurance take greater risks).
148. See Allen N. Berger, Richard J. Herring, & Giorgio Szegö, The Role of Capital in
Financial Institutions, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 393, 400, 407 (1995).
149. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Resolving the Regulator’s Dilemma: International Coordi-
nation of Banking Regulations, 43 INT’L ORG. 322, 324 (1989); Jeffrey Atik, Basel II: A Post-
Crisis Post-Mortem, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 731, 737 (2011) (“[A]bsent some
harmonizing imperatives, nations would implement levels with regard to local imperatives
only, with the result that there would be inconsistent capital requirements, some low and
others high, creating competitive distortions and externalization effects when viewed from an
international perspective.”). See also van Zandt, supra note 101, at 74.
150. See Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Mussa Theorem (and Other Re-
sults on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard) 3 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/04/192, 2004) (“But
what about international investors, which had contributed to the crises through their reckless
lending behavior? They were let off the hook with the help of IMF crisis lending. There had
to be ‘investor moral hazard.’”).
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pendence problem manifests itself in the form of competitive deregulation
or loosening of capital requirements. The need to counteract this race-to-
the-bottom is often expressed as a desire to enforce a “level playing
field,”151 and the various multilateral agreements on capital adequacy
seek to do just that.152
International capital adequacy agreements present a problem of coop-
eration rather than coordination and give rise to a strategic environment
that can be modeled as a repeated, multilateral prisoner’s dilemma.153
Consistent with the prisoner’s dilemma (and accompanying race-to-the-
bottom metaphor), it is in each individual state’s interest to allow its do-
mestic financial institutions to take on slightly more risk than the global
optimum, but at the same time, each state shirking on capital adequacy
leads to a collectively worse outcome.154 That is to say, a more fragile
global financial system than could otherwise could be achieved if all par-
ties cooperated. Although parties to a repeated prisoner’s dilemma may
be able to maintain a cooperative equilibrium in some contexts, interna-
tional capital adequacy agreements do not meet all of the conditions nec-
essary for that to be the case.155 Most notably, capital adequacy rules are
151. See Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 891 (1995); Atik, supra note 149, at 741 (“[T]he specific concern of estab-
lishing and maintaining a level playing field among financial institutions competing in global
markets might dominate the safety and soundness concerns that primarily motivate national
banking regulators. That is, establishing even-handed conditions of competitiveness merely
requires that equivalent capital standards be imposed; beyond this, competiveness concerns
fail to generate the target levels of minimum capital.”); ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 30,
at 194–95.
152. See TARULLO, supra note 36, at 45–46 (“Basel I was motivated by two interacting
concerns—the risk posed to the stability of the global financial system by low capital levels of
internationally active banks and the competitive advantages accruing to banks subject to
lower capital requirements.”); BASEL II, supra note 1, ¶ 4 (articulating the same principles in
the official document).
153. The well-known result of the basic prisoner’s dilemma is that the dominant strat-
egy is for both players to defect: for any decision of State A, State B maximizes its payoff by
defecting, and vice versa. A simplified two-player, single period prisoner’s dilemma can be
depicted as follows:
Column (State B) Strict Capital Loose Capital
Requirements Requirements
Row (State A) Strict Capital (2, 2) (0, 3)
Requirements
Loose Capital (3, 0) (1, 1)
Requirements
154. See Kapstein, supra note 149, at 324 (arguing that the Basel Accords created a
prisoner’s dilemma, which he refers to as a “regulators dilemma”); TARULLO, supra note 36,
at 53, 200 (noting that “race to the bottom” concerns animated the Basel Committee’s capital
adequacy agenda); Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Robert Marquez, Competition Among Regula-
tors and Credit market Integration, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 411 (2006).
155. See POSNER & SYKES, supra note 6, at 27; Telser, supra note 97, at 40. Cooperation
may be self-enforcing if parties to multi-player games are capable of adopting punishment
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extremely complex and leave ample room for discretion in their imple-
mentation, which makes compliance difficult to monitor. In addition, even
assuming that states’ non-compliance can be detected, compliance will not
be enforced because of a free riding problem in the punishment phase.
When one state allows the capital adequacy of its financial sector to
slacken in order to gain a competitive advantage, the reduction in interna-
tional financial stability is diffuse and systemic. Because there is no single
state that bears a disproportionate amount of the harm, none will see a
positive expected value in pursuing costly measures to retaliate against the
non-cooperative party. With no state in a position to credibly threaten a
cost for non-compliance, cooperation will tend to break down. The predic-
tion under this analysis is that states will find it difficult to effectively ad-
dress the interdependence problem of maintaining financial stability
through capital adequacy requirements.
2. Evaluating International Capital Adequacy Agreements
International cooperation on capital adequacy has primarily been pur-
sued through the Basel Committee, an intergovernmental network of
banking regulators established in 1974. The Basel Committee quickly is-
sued its Concordat of 1975, which outlined a set of best practices standards
to be followed by domestic bank supervisors.156 It has also subsequently
developed three iterations of an agreement that provides quantitative
benchmarks for the amount and quality of capital that banks must hold,
the first of which was made in 1988 and is known as Basel I.157 The basic
structure of Basel I was to sort asset types by quality and then specify a
risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratio that a covered financial institution
must hold.158 Importantly, Basel I did not attempt to measure asset quality
strategies similar to the “grim trigger” strategy or Axelrod’s “tit-for-tat” solution in two
player games. See ROBERT AXELROD, The Success of TIT FOR TAT in Computer Tourna-
ments, in THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27 (1984). Cf. Paul G. Mahoney & Chris Wil-
liam Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the Role of Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1285
(2003) (offering what they term a “defection from deviation” strategy, which they argue is
more conducive to cooperative equilibria than tit-for-tat and may apply to games with more
than two players). All of these strategies, however, rest on the ability of parties to monitor
each others’ compliance, as well as their willingness to incur the cost of imposing sanctions on
counterparties once breaches of compliance have been detected.
156. See, e.g., BASEL CONCORDAT, supra note 36. See also Eric J. Pan, Challenge of
International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond Trans-
governmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 270 (2011) (“More stringent capital adequacy
requirements can be a substitute for additional supervision.”).
157. See BASEL I, supra note 42; cf. Pan, supra 156.
158. Basel I’s determinations of which assets were low-risk, a category that included
home mortgages and sovereign debt, may sound quaint to the contemporary ear. Sovereign
debt was given a risk weight of 0—meaning it was considered risk free—while secured mort-
gages of residential properties were risk-weighted at 50%. TARULLO, supra note 36, at 54–58
tbl.3.2.
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within asset types.159 This meant that under a Basel I assessment, a stated-
income subprime mortgage or Greek sovereign bond would be considered
as safe as a fully documented 20-20 mortgage or a U.S. treasury. Basel I,
along with its later iterations, is an example of soft law, meaning that it is
not technically binding international law in the same way that a formal
treaty would be.
It is difficult to see how Basel I restrained the risk taking of financial
institutions in a meaningful way. After risk-weighting, Basel I required
banks to hold “Tier 2” capital at an eight percent level, a number that
implied no increase in the capitalization of the banking system because it
was the observed average level of capital in place at the time.160 An imme-
diate problem was that regulated banks could take on more risk while
maintaining the required eight percent level, simply by moving up the risk
curve within asset types: if all mortgages carry the same risk weight, hold
riskier mortgages.161 In addition, compliance with prescribed capital ratios
was self-reported by member countries and not verified through any moni-
toring mechanism. As a result, purported compliance by large portions of
the international banking sector was never verified and largely “cosmetic”
in nature.162 One unavoidable data point is Japan’s booming banking in-
dustry, which Basel I was arguably most intended to restrain. The collapse
of the Japanese financial sector in the early 1990s, just a few years after
Basel I was implemented, involved opportunistic accounting practices, bla-
tant misreporting, incorrigibly generous lending, and a cleanup that even-
tually imposed a cost equal to twenty percent of Japan’s GDP.163 In any
case, Basel I is not widely touted as a success, and was eventually replaced
159. Id., at 57 (“As can be seen by examining the Basel I risk categories . . . the assign-
ment of assets was based principally on the generic nature of the borrower, rather than the
borrower’s specific financial characteristics or credit history.”).
160. Atik, supra note 149, at 739. Tier 2 Capital provided the most capacious definition
of which assets constituted capital, while Tier 1 Capital consisted only of common shares and
retained earnings.
161. See Takeo Hoshi, Implementation of Basel III in the US Will Bring Back the Regu-
latory Arbitrage Problems Under Basel I, VOX, at 2, Dec. 23, 2012 (“Since the risk weights
classification in the Basel I regulation was coarse, the same ‘bucket’ included the assets with
very different risk levels. This led some banks to shift their portfolios to hold more risky (and
hence higher return) assets within the same risk assets category, thereby increasing their risk
without increasing regulatory capital.”).
162. Compare Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and International Soft Law: Why Do Coun-
tries Implement the Basle Accord?, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 647, 653 (2002) (attempting to explain
the puzzle of widespread adoption of with Basel I), with ANDREW WALTER, GOVERNING
FINANCE: EAST ASIA’S ADOPTION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (2008) (finding that large
portions of the Asian banking sector engaged in “mock compliance” with capital adequacy
standards).
163. Japan and the other Basel Committee members adopted implementing regulation
in 1990, which was supposed to be effectively enforced as of December 31, 1992. See
TARULLO, supra note 36, at 71–72; Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Unnatural Selection: Perverse
Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan, 95 AMER. ECON. REV. 1144, 1165 (2005);
Takatoshi Ito & Yuri Nagataki Sasaki, Impacts of the Basle Capital Standard on Japanese
Banks’ Behavior, 16 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 372 (2002).
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by Basel II. Drafting for Basel II began in 1998 and concluded in 2004,
setting the stage for a prolonged implementation process.
An innovation of Basel II was its new “three pillar” structure, which in
a certain sense combined the approaches of Basel I and the Concordat:
Pillar 1 provided revised quantitative requirements; Pillar 2 outlined su-
pervisory best practices; and Pillar 3 contained disclosure requirements
meant to increase market discipline.164 A premise of Basel II was that the
risk-weighting system of Basel I was too rudimentary for modern finance,
and that the most sophisticated measurement of risk could be obtained by
using banks’own internal risk-metrics, through a so-called IRB (internal
ratings-based) approach. Basel II therefore used banks’ internal value-at-
risk metrics (known as VaR) as a starting point, to be modified by various
departures seen as relevant for regulatory capital. At the time, Basel II
was considered an impressively “long and detailed regulatory product”
and the crowning achievement of the NIFA and transgovernmental
networks.165
Basel II did not have defects as glaring as those of Basel I, but none-
theless contained features that enabled states to nominally comply with its
provisions while still encouraging their financial sectors to engage in com-
petitive deleveraging. Most generally, the complexity and self-reporting
nature of the IRB metrics facilitated regulatory arbitrage, and could easily
be gamed by large banks with byzantine internal structures and access to
off-balance sheet investment vehicles. One specific avenue for regulatory
arbitrage was the decision to embed credit ratings into IRB calculations,
so that banks holding AAA assets were scored as safer according to Basel
II benchmarks. This created a buy-side demand—which the ratings agen-
cies became willing to meet—for AAA securitized assets that allowed
banks to take on risks that appeared riskless for regulatory purposes.166
Another significant flaw of Basel II was its pro-cyclicality. Balance sheets
look better at the height of an asset bubble than when it bursts, which
means that holding capital requirements constant over the business cycle
(as Basel II does) allows for over-lending during the boom and a credit
164. See Abel Elizalde, From Basel I to Basel II: An Analysis of the Three Pillars,
(Center for Monetary & Fin. Studies [CEMFI], Working Paper No. 0704, 2007).
165. See Informal Procedure, supra note 19, at 547, 572–80 (2005) (“the contrast be-
tween the first Basel Accord on capital adequacy . . . which was concluded in secret by the
Basel Committee in 1988 and released in a twelve-page document, and . . . [Basel II], which
was put through most of a decade’s worth of comment by hundreds of interested individuals
and institutions and resulted in a correspondingly long and detailed regulatory product.”);
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Book Review, 104 AM. J. INT’L L 338, 341 (2010) (reviewing DANIEL
K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULA-
TION (2008)) (referring to the widespread perception that “[t]he Basel capital standards may
be the crown jewel of network governance”); Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global
Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 17 (2006).
166. See Charles W. Calomiris, The Debasement of Ratings: What’s Wrong and How We
Can Fix It, 3 ECONOMICS21.ORG, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.economics21.org/content/2the-de-
basement-ratings-whats-wrong-and-how-we-can-fix-it; Atik, supra note 149, at 750–51. Inter-
estingly, the credit rating agencies were early opponents of the IRB approach, arguing that it
would debase their standards and lead to “ratings shopping.” TARULLO, supra note 36, at 98.
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contraction during the bust.167 In addition, Basel II’s definition of the
highest-quality, Tier 1 capital was slowly loosened over time to cover as-
sets, such as deferred tax assets, that did not provide a meaningful buffer
against downside risks.168 Finally, like Basel I, compliance with Basel II
was self-reported and the agreement did not provide for any enforcement
mechanism should a party fall short of its requirements.
As with Basel I, a compelling case can be made that Basel II had no
positive effect on the capitalization of the banking sector or the stability of
the global financial system.169 As an initial matter, when the 2008 Crisis
arrived, Basel II requirements did not cover significant portions of the
global financial system: U.S. regulators continuously delayed applying the
rules to traditional deposit-taking banks, and from the outset the require-
ments were never designed to include entities in the shadow banking sys-
tem or to insurers selling credit default swaps.170 To the extent that Basel
II was imposed, regulatory arbitrage meant that even the most risk-seek-
ing and fragile institutions—such as Northern Rock, Lehman Brothers and
Bear Stearns—were able to meet its rigors without much trouble.171 And
at the height of the crisis in fall of 2008, market actors ignored regulatory
capital under the IRB metrics and Basel requirements altogether, retreat-
ing to a simple leverage ratio to evaluate firms’ solvency. Ultimately, it
167. See George G. Pennacchi, Risk-Based Capital Standards, Deposit Insurance, and
Procyclicality, 14 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 432, 437 (2005); Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C.
Stein, Cyclical Implications of the Basel II Capital Standards, 28 ECON. PERSP. 18 (2004);
Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, The Procyclical Effects of Basel II, (CEMFI, Working Paper
No. 0809, 2008).
168. Deferred tax assets carry over deductible losses from previous years and therefore
are only available in years when banks turn a profit. Some commentators argue that the
watering down of what constitutes “capital” reflects that the Basel II process was subject to
capture by the financial industry. See, e.g., Ranjit Lall, Why Basel II Failed and Why Any
Basel III Is Doomed (Global Econ. Governance, Working Paper No. 2009/52, 2009) (making
this point).
169. Some go so far as to argue that Basel II allowed banks to decrease their capital.
See, e.g., ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 30, at 184–85; HAL SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FI-
NANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION, 437–38, 441 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds.,
2010); Verdier, supra note 9, at 1452 (“Unsurprisingly, Basel II was strongly supported by the
largest international banks, in the expectation that it would allow them to reduce their capital
levels.”); TARULLO, supra note 36, at 101–03.
170. These gaps give an irony to the Basel Committee sub-group responsible for over-
seeing implementation of Basel II, referred to as “AIG” (the Accord Implementation
Group).
171. See supra note 2 (citing to government reports representing that these firms com-
plied with Basel II at the time of their failure). See also Mishkin, supra note 77, at 5 (“[I]t was
an open secret in the financial markets and among government officials that if any of the
major investment banks would run into trouble, Lehman would be at the top of the list.
Lehman was among the most leveraged of the major investment banks; it was unwilling to
raise capital; it had a poor reputation for risk management; and it had a high exposure to
losses on subprime mortgages.”). The FDIC noted that as of summer of 2006, “more than 99
percent of all insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the highest regulatory
capital standards.” DIV. INS. & RES., FED. DEPOSIT INS. COMM’N, FDIC QUARTERLY BANK-
ING PROFILE: SECOND QUARTER 2006, 3 (2006).
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may suffice to observe that the Basel II-era coincided with a crisis in which
“over-leveraged” became a household term and that, “[t]he capital re-
quired by Basel II (and the prior Basel Accord) simply proved inadequate
to save many important banks (and large swaths of the international bank-
ing system) from destruction during the [2008] Crisis.”172
In the wake of the 2008 Crisis, governments did not retreat from the
capital adequacy aspirations of the NIFA and Basel II. Instead, at the be-
hest of the G-20, the Basel Committee formulated a next generation of
capital adequacy rules known as Basel III, which the G-20 approved in
late 2010.173 Basel III seeks to increase requisite capital ratios compared
to Basel II, provide more stringent risk-weighting criteria, and address li-
quidity management in more depth.174 In response to concerns over pro-
cyclicality, Basel III introduces a “capital conservation buffer.”175 To ad-
dress the critique that Basel II was overly complex, Basel III introduces a
minimum non-risk-weighted leverage ratio.176 In light of these more rigor-
ous targets, Basel III has an extensive implementation period pursuant to
which banks are not required to comply with the strictest requirements
until 2018 or 2019.177
If Basel III is complied with as planned, it could result in a modestly
better capitalized global banking system.178 However, Basel III has built-
in loopholes that are symptomatic of the underlying prisoner’s dilemma
dynamic that states face when agreeing to international capital require-
ments.179 The most ominous sign is Basel III’s near decade-long phase-
172. Atik, supra note 149, at 733.
173. The Basel Committee announced Basel III on September 12, 2010; it was approved
at the G-20 Seoul summit on November 12, 2010, and officially published on December 16,
2010. See BASEL III, supra note 87.
174. See Bernd P. Delahaye, Basel III: Capital Adequacy and Liquidity after the Finan-
cial Crisis 7–9 (Apr. 22, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard Law School).
175. See BASEL III, supra note 87, at 54.
176. Id. at 61.
177. Id. at annex 4.
178. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, RE-
SULTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE QUANTITATIVE IMPACT STUDY 10 tbls.3 (2010) (estimating
that banks would need to raise an additional _602 billion in common equity to hit the 2019
Tier 1 capital targets), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs186.htm;. See also Eric A. Posner & Alan
O. Sykes, International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic Cooperation 13 (Public L. &
Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 396, 2012).
179. U.S. lawmakers are not unaware of the strategic implications involved. See WAL-
TER W. EUBANKS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41467, THE STATUS OF THE BASEL III CAPI-
TAL ADEQUACY ACCORD 1 (2010) (“The new Basel Capital Adequacy Accord (Basel III) is
of concern to Congress mainly because it could put U.S. financial institutions at a competitive
disadvantage in world financial markets . . . Higher capital requirements constrain bank lend-
ing and profitability.”). A day after Basel Committee members approved the quantitative
capital requirements of Basel III, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd
issued a statement warning of the potential for international regulatory arbitrage in imple-
menting Basel III. Id.
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in.180 As with the implementation of Basel II, the lengthy phase-in will
give the financial industry time to lobby for weaker restrictions, with gov-
ernments eager to acquiesce after their economies have exited a crisis at-
mosphere.181 In addition, Basel III’s attempt to counteract pro-cyclicality
is not particularly credible: it provides bank supervisors the option of in-
creasing the capital buffers of individual banks on a confidential basis,
when regulators divine that the economy is entering a bubble. Basel III’s
scope is also primarily limited to deposit taking banks, and it does not
attempt to cover the sprawling shadow banking system—including money
market mutual funds, asset-backed commercial paper, and repo markets—
that was at the heart of the 2008 meltdown. Finally and most basically,
Basel III maintains Basel II’s sprawling complexity, which is not substan-
tially restrained by a meager three percent leverage requirement, and was
fertile ground for regulatory arbitrage the first time around.182
Basel III embodies the hope that if policymakers can just get the equa-
tions right, banks’ risk-taking can be restrained and a level international
playing field preserved. But international capital adequacy agreements
have not been an effective means for providing the global public good of
financial stability, and the current regime exhibits flaws shared by past
attempts. This result is not surprising in light of an analysis of capital ade-
quacy as a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma, in which states receive the
highest payoff from adopting a non-cooperative strategy of lax implemen-
tation and competitive deleveraging. The experience with cooperation on
capital adequacy is thus less positive than is the case of harmonization of
standards, and suggests that the international financial architecture will
continue to have difficulty mitigating the instability that accompanies
global financial integration.
C. Crisis Management
How the international financial architecture performs in managing cri-
ses after they appear presents complicated strategic problems and is a sig-
nificant part of minimizing the losses that arise from global finance’s
instability. Getting crisis management policies right is especially important
because forward-looking market actors will take risks and conduct busi-
ness in light of what they perceive to be the endgame regulatory policies in
180. See generally Narissa Lyngen, Note, Basel III: Dynamics of State Implementation,
53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 519, 529 (2012) (“[T]he regulations provide for gradual implementation
over the course of six years, starting in 2013.”).
181. Impressively, this process is already well underway, as reflected in the abandon-
ment of Basel III’s original liquidity management rules in January of 2013. See Brooke Mas-
ters, Banks Win More Flexible Rules, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013 (“the final rule approved by the
supervisors of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is significantly more flexible
than the draft version put forward more than two years ago.”).
182. See ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 30, at 176–77 (“Basel III fixed th[e] minimum
leverage level at 3 percent. If this number looks outrageously low, it is because this number is
outrageously low.”).
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the event that those risks materialize and large losses occur.183 Part C.1
examines this problem with respect to firms, as it is manifested in the need
for a cross-border resolution authority; Part C.2 looks at management of
crises involving government finances, and the ability for states to provide a
workable international lender of last resort.
The analysis below suggests that the international financial architec-
ture, as constituted in the NIFA and augmented post-2008, is not in a posi-
tion to successfully navigate the most substantial interdependence
problems raised by crisis management. However, as Section III.A below
explains, certain incremental solutions exist—such as scaling cooperation
to the regional level and focusing on coordination problems within cooper-
ation games—that are likely to be political feasible and make crisis man-
agement more efficient.
1. Cross-Border Bank Resolutions
a. Defining the Interdependence Problem
One form of crisis management takes place when one or more finan-
cial institutions approach cash flow insolvency (i.e. are “distressed”) and
governments face a spectrum of choices concerning its resolution.184 The
interventionist extreme is to provide the distressed institution a direct in-
jection of additional capital; in other words, a bailout. At the other ex-
treme is breaking up or liquidating the institution in a process analogous
to Chapter 7 bankruptcy. A middle ground approach is for regulators to
broker and subsidize a merger of the failed financial institution into a will-
ing buyer.185
In the domestic context, governments struggle to develop optimal res-
olution rules, for reasons that interact with and foreshadow the interna-
tional problem. In good economic times before a crisis hits, the best policy
is to announce relatively stringent conditions under which a bank will be
recapitalized. This reduces moral hazard and provides market discipline to
the extent that bank creditors expect to suffer losses in the event of institu-
tional failure and monitor banks’ risk-taking accordingly. During a period
of crisis however, when gains from market discipline are less palpable,
183. See Stijn Claessens, How to Prevent and Better Handle the Failures of Global
Systemically Important Financial Institutions, Presentation at the Financial Risk and Regula-
tion Conference at Columbia University 1 (Mar. 27, 2013) (paper on file with Columbia Uni-
versity) (“Logic suggests starting from the endgame, [which] . . . strongly affects supervisory
incentives and market behavior long before difficulties arise.”).
184. Use of the term “resolution” varies; here it’s meant in its broadest sense to include
the entire menu of regulatory action available. See, e.g., Stijn Claessens, Conference: Finan-
cial Risk and Regulation: Unfinished Business, Columbia University, March 27, 2012 (“reso-
lution [is] the process of how a weak financial institution is (in part) liquidated, closed,
broken up, sold, or recapitalized.”).
185. The middle approach can be understood as a form of quasi-recapitalization be-
cause the government often ensures that the buyer makes the deal on favorable terms. See
Herring, supra note 125, at 30. For example, the Federal Reserve took on certain “toxic”
assets from Bear Stearns’s balance sheet as a condition of its acquisition by J.P. Morgan
Chase. Id. at 35.
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there is immense pressure to avoid the uncertainty and market disruptions
caused by emergency liquidation of a firm that is perceived to be Too-Big-
to-Fail (TBTF) and instead provide a direct injection of taxpayer-financed
capital. In other words, there is always a temptation to declare an institu-
tion TBTF and provide a bailout at the time of its failure.186 The lure of
TBTF is an example of a general policy problem known as dynamic incon-
sistency, in which policies that are preferred ex ante are dis-preferred ex
post.187 Governments can overcome dynamic inconsistency problems if,
like Ulysses, they can credibly commit to tying themselves to the mast of
optimal ex ante policies. But reliable commitment devices are scarce.188
At the international level, the impending failure of a Global-Systemi-
cally Important Financial Institution (G-SIFI)189 presents somewhat dis-
tinct interdependence problems that appear at both the decision over
whether to provide a bailout and, if not, how to proceed with resolution.
The decision to recapitalize a G-SIFI creates an interdependence problem
when multiple states benefit from the bailout but must negotiate over
sharing costs after the fact. States will have an incentive to understate their
share of the problem ex post, and because such free riding can be antici-
pated ex ante, there will be an under-provision of the public good of re-
capitalization.190 However, the significance of the recapitalization
question as an interdependence problem is indeterminate, because dy-
namic inconsistency creates a countervailing incentive at the domestic
186. History suggests that breaking up banks is not a simple solution to TBTF:
thousands of Depression-era thrifts and 1980s S&Ls, each of which were very small, collec-
tively became “too numerous to fail.” Cf. Viral Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Too Many to
Fail—An Analysis of Time-Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies, 16 J. FIN. INTERMEDIA-
TION 1 (2007).
187. Dynamic inconsistency can be understood as involving a single agent in a coopera-
tion game with itself across time, where the goal is to achieve cooperation between past and
future selves. Technically, dynamic inconsistency involves non-cooperation as a sub-game
perfect equilibrium of this extensive form game. See Daniel B. Klein, The Microfoundations
of Rules vs. Discretion, 1 CONST. POL. ECON., no. 3 1990, at 1; Finn. E. Kydland & Edward C.
Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, J. POL. ECON.
473, 475 (1977).
188. See SCHELLING, supra note 96, at 27–28.
189. See Stijn Claessens, Richard J. Herring, & Dirk Schoenmaker, A Safer World Fi-
nancial System: Improving the Resolution of Systemic Institutions, VOX, July 8, 2010, at 1
(“On average, the thirty largest [G-SIFIs] have 53% of their assets abroad . . . have close to
1,000 subsidiaries, of which 68% operate abroad and 12% in offshore financial centers.”).
190. See Xavier Freixas, Crisis Management in Europe, in FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN
EUROPE 102 (Jeroen J.M. Kremers et al. eds., 2003) (providing a formal model illustrating
recapitalization in Europe); Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Fiscal Burden Sharing
in Cross-Border Banking Crises, 5 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 141 (2009); Ata Can Bertay, Asli
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Harry Huizinga, Is the Financial Safety Net a Barrier to Cross-Border
Banking?, 3 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5947, 2012) (“Recapitalizing a
distressed international bank is taken to be costly relative to simply liquidating the bank. The
benefits of recapitalizing the bank, however, are dispersed over the countries where the bank
operates. For the bank to be recapitalized, the concerned countries have to collectively share
the cost. Contributing to this cost is an international public good.”).
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level to bailout institutions more often than is optimal.At least in the-
ory,the balance of these forces is unclear191
A more clear-cut interdependence problem appears once a state de-
cides to dissolve rather than bailout a bank. Given the decision to liqui-
date a financial institution, states face the option of pursuing either a
territorial or universal approach. The territorial approach, sometimes re-
ferred to as ring-fencing, means that a government treats a G-SIFI’s assets
within its jurisdiction as the relevant fund against which domestic creditors
can make claims with priority over foreign creditors.192 A universal ap-
proach implies coordination among jurisdictions in which the institution
did business, so that liquidation proceeds against a common, cross-border
pool of the institution’s assets. The territorial approach is less globally effi-
cient than the universal, because it creates an arbitrary risk to creditors
based on where an asset is located.193 The interdependence problem thus
concerns whether, during the resolution process, states can successfully co-
operate to treat domestic and foreign assets in their jurisdiction in a non-
discriminatory manner that is globally efficient.
Applying a universal approach to cross-border resolution entails a co-
operation problem that will be difficult for states to overcome. As with
capital adequacy agreements, states face a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma
in which the dominant strategy is to defect from cooperative behavior that
would maximize joint gains if adhered to by all: each state is better off
ring-fencing domestic assets of a failed G-SIFI that are located in its juris-
diction, regardless of whether or not other states do the same. The precon-
ditions for overcoming a prisoner’s dilemma are also not met in this
context, specifically the requirement that there be indefinite, repeated
play. Global financial crises are not routine enough events for states to
regularly engage in cross-border resolution and build trust through re-
peated cooperation and credible threats of reciprocal punishment in sub-
191. Compare Xavier Freixas, Systemic Risk and Prudential Regulation in the Global
Economy, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s 10th Annual International
Banking and Finance Conference on Globalization and Systemic Risk 145, 156-57 (Sept. 27,
2007), in GLOBALIZATION AND SYSTEMIC RISK (Douglas Darrell Evanhoff ed., 2009) (argu-
ing that governments will bailout G-SIFIs in their jurisdictions too often) with Edward J.
Kane, Incentive Conflict in Central-Bank Responses to Sectorial Turmoil in Financial Hub
Countries 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13593, 2007) (governments
are under-incentivized to bailout G-SIFIs in their jurisdiction). As one example of the former
point, the United States’s unilateral bailout of AIG—which insured large quantities of
RMBS and CDOs held by foreign institutions—arguably represents the provision of a global
public good, and illustrates a case of domestic dynamic inconsistency trumping the difficulties
of international collective action. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 943, 979 (2009).
192. See Kathleen A. Scott, Cross-Border Resolution and International Banks, 242 N.Y.
LAW. J. 97, 97 (2009).
193. See Jonathan Fiechter et al., Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit All? 24
(IMF, Staff Discussion Note, No. SDN/11/04, 2011). The existence of such a credit risk is
reflected in the fact that a multinational bank’s cost of funds raised through a foreign subsidi-
ary is measurably higher than the cost of funds for a purely domestic bank. See Bertay et al.,
supra note 190, at 2.
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sequent periods. As Bank of England governor Mervyn King remarked
regarding the endgame mentality of governments and regulators during
the 2008: “global banks are global in life but national in death.”194 For this
reason, the interdependence problem of cross-border resolution should be
expected to remain substantially unsolved.
b. Evaluating Cooperation on a Cross-Border Bank Resolutions
Unlike the case of capital adequacy, no international agreement pro-
viding for the coordination of cross-border resolutions has been devel-
oped.195 The only vaguely relevant agreements of the NIFA were the
IOSCO Memoranda of Understanding, which call for information-sharing
between regulatory during the normal course of bank supervision.196 The
lack of substantial progress on cross-border resolution was noted as a gap
in the NIFA, but in retrospect seems to have been underappreciated and
lost amid the proliferation of principles for prudential and supervisory best
practices.
Consistent with the relative institutional void, the 2008 Crisis was
characterized by little cross-border coordination of bank resolutions.197 A
leading example was the resolution of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
(LBHI)—the Lehman parent company that reportedly consisted of 2,985
legal entities in 50 countries—which was forced into liquidation bank-
ruptcy on September 15, 2008, after last minute attempts at a government-
brokered merger failed. While U.S. authorities let the parent company fail,
the demise of its U.S. broker-dealer subsidiary, Lehman Brothers Inc., was
managed much more generously. Lehman Brothers Inc. received liquidity
support from the N.Y. Fed to keep its prime brokerage activities opera-
tional for a week while its sale to Barclays Capital was being negotiated.198
The resolution of parent LBHI was less orderly. The holding company’s
entrance into bankruptcy left foreign subsidiaries illiquid, accounting of
where assets were located relative to where trades were booked became
indeterminate, and even basic IT and data repository systems were so frag-
mented globally that many foreign subsidiaries became physically inoper-
194. Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Serv. Auth., Speech at the Turner Review Press Con-
ference (Mar. 18, 2009) (quoting Mervyn King).
195. See Herring, supra note 125, at 38–42 (summarizing history of cross-border resolu-
tion pre-2008). The Basel Committee tentatively raised the idea during the early decades of
financial integration but without concrete results. See Verdier, supra note 9, at 1455 (noting
that the Basel Committee could not reach an agreement on the issue of international
lending).
196. See IOSCO MMOU, supra 58 and accompanying text.
197. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, RE-
PORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP [herein-
after CBBRG REPORT], at 14 (2010) (“Coordination among [international resolution]
proceedings has been limited, at best.”).
198. Herring, supra note 125, at 53. See also Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 481 (2010) (arguing that the handling of the
subsidiary Lehman Brothers Inc. is an example of a relatively efficient and successful
resolution).
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able. As a result, “significant value was destroyed by the lack of
cooperation in the unwinding of the Lehman Group which may continue
for a decade.”199
Lack of cross-border cooperation on bank resolution was not limited
to the United States.200 When Iceland’s financial sector collapsed in fall of
2008, the U.K. took the aggressive step of using its anti-terrorism laws to
freeze all local assets of Landsbanki, Iceland’s largest bank.201 In re-
sponse, Iceland resorted to unilateralism as well, passing legislation that
nationalized Landsbanki (along with the nation’s second largest bank,
Kaupthing) without providing any recourse to foreign depositors. The two
countries’ lack of cooperation cannot be explained as the inevitable result
of incompatible financial regulatory frameworks. As a member of the Eu-
ropean Economic Union, Iceland was subject to the European Financial
Conglomerates Directive, a regulatory umbrella that also covered the
United Kingdom.
Another dysfunctional case involved the resolution of Fortis.202 There,
the governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands fueled
rather than calmed market turmoil when each provided independent capi-
tal injections to Fortis subsidiaries within their jurisdictions rather than to
the multinational parent, Fortis Group. After the respective recapitaliza-
tions, local interests continued to create frictions: the Netherlands eventu-
ally nationalized Fortis’s Dutch entities, while the Belgian/Luxembourg
entities were sold off to BNP Paribas only after lengthy battles in Belgian
courts. The one mixed but arguably positive counterexample was the reso-
lution of Dexia, where Belgium, France, and Luxembourg all coordinated
to provide guarantees based on pro-rata ownership of the bank among the
three countries.203 Taken together, these examples reflect a track record
during the 2008 Crisis that is characterized by the predominance of a terri-
torial, uncoordinated approach.
After 2008, the need for greater cooperation on cross-border resolu-
tion was widely recognized as an important part of global financial stabil-
ity, but concrete progress towards a universal approach has been limited.
Specifically, the Basel Committee’s Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group
published a set of recommendations and the Financial Stability Board
drafted its Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes, both of which
199. Herring, supra note 125, at 56.
200. See CBBRG REPORT, supra note 196, at 10–14; Herring, supra note 125, at 38–57.
201. Herring, supra note 125, at 47–48.
202. Fortis was a financial conglomerate incorporated Belgium, that also had a large
presence in the Netherlands and Luxembourg. It began to fail around September 28, 2008.
203. However, even this agreement was subject to considerable squabbling and renego-
tiation after the fact. In 2011, Dexia received a second bailout, had a branch nationalized by
the Belgian government (Belfius), and did not have its resolution plan approved by the EU
until four years after the fact. See Laurence Norman, EU Approves Dexia’s Plan, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 28, 2012 (“Approval for the restructuring plan ends a year of wrangling over Dexia’s
future, which had seen the Commission raise serious doubts about the original French and
Belgian plans for the firm. Paris and Brussels have also frequently been at odds over how to
divvy up the costs of the various government intervention.”).
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were endorsed by the G20 heads-of-state.204 Although these documents
recommend the idea of a universal approach, they also provide a range of
other suggestions in recognition of the fact that states remain unwilling to
agree on a truly international resolution mechanism at this time.205 Even
the proposed EU “banking union,” upon inspection, does not provide for
a common resolution mechanism, and instead only includes common su-
pervisory procedures that cover a fraction of Europe’s banks.206 Thus, an
international agreement embracing the universal approach to resolution
does not appear to be politically feasible at present. Through backwards
induction, states perceive that at the moment of crisis compliance with an
agreement will break down, and therefore are hesitant to make binding
commitments beforehand.
What the Basel Committee and FSB resolution reports do contain are
the NIFA-era staple of abstractly stated best practices and unenforceable
exhortations for states to work in a cooperative and non-discriminatory
manner when engaging in resolution.207 There is reason to doubt the effi-
cacy of this hortatory approach in light of the 2008 experience, which did
not lack similar documents encouraging cooperation, and where, “[i]n no
case [Lehman, Fortis, Dexia, Iceland], despite the numerous Memoranda
of Understanding pledging the sharing of information, did the primary su-
pervisor share information in advance of the collapse with their colleagues
in other countries.”208 When the next crisis hits, it is likely that states will
face the same strategic incentives as in 2008 and may once again not feel
compelled by vaguely worded reports to refrain from pursuing a territorial
approach to ring-fencing the assets of failed banks in their jurisdictions.209
In summary, attempts to coordinate the resolution of cross-border fi-
nancial institutions were not a prominent part of the NIFA agenda, but are
now considered an important piece of the regulatory response to the 2008
204. CBBRG REPORT, supra note 197, ¶ 1. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVI-
SION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, RESOLUTION POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS—PROGRESS
SO FAR (2011). The IMF also made parallel proposals. See SEAN HAGAN & JOSÉ VIÑALS,
RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKS—A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED CO-
ORDINATION (2010).
205. See CBBRG REPORT, supra note 197, at 16–22.
206. See Wolfgang Münchau, Politics Undermines Hope of Banking Union, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 16, 2012) (“If you study the details of [the proposed banking union], the substance
evaporates.”); see also Patrick Jenkins & Alex Barker, Cyprus levy Plan ‘Bleak Day for
Banking Union’, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2013) (speculating that an emergency tax on bank
deposits in Cyprus was a serious setback for progress on an E.U. banking union).
207. See, e.g., CBBRG REPORT, supra note 197, at 36 (“Recommendation 7: . . . Key
home and host authorities should agree, consistent with national law and policy, on arrange-
ments that ensure the timely production and sharing of the needed information, both for
purposes of contingency planning during normal times and for crisis management and resolu-
tion during times of stress.”).
208. Herring, supra note 125, at 57.
209. See CBBRG REPORT, supra note 197, ¶ 102 (“[G]iven recent experience there are
reasonable concerns that MoUs will not be followed in times of crisis as national authorities
are accountable to national governing bodies with respect to how they take local interests
into account.”).
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Crisis. A basic game theoretic analysis indicates that resolving G-SIFIs in a
manner consistent with universal resolution principles presents a problem
of cooperation that will be difficult for states to resolve. The 2008 experi-
ence, in which states rushed to ring-fence local assets, is consistent with the
rational choice model and does not provide a promising precedent. Recent
efforts to agree on a binding commitment to universal resolution have not
met with much success. Although less ambitious than a universal resolu-
tion mechanism, the following Section III.A will argue that international
harmonization of living wills for G-SIFIs presents a more tractable reform
and may be a useful tool for making cross-border resolutions more effi-
cient going forward.
2. An International Lender of Last Resort
a. Defining the Interdependence Problem
As with private financial institutions, states may be subject to runs
when investors lose confidence in their ability to maintain a currency peg
or repay sovereign debt. There is therefore a theoretical case for having an
“international lender of last resort” (I-LLR) entity that functions similar
to a domestic central bank and provides emergency lending to states that
are experiencing financial crises. The destabilizing effect of the 2008 Crisis
on the Eurozone has shown that developed as well as developing econo-
mies may fall into crisis and require access to emergency loans, making the
role of an I-LLR a central regulatory question facing the current interna-
tional financial architecture. This Section identifies the underlying interde-
pendence problems that an I-LLR mechanism raises, and evaluates the
success of the IMF in addressing them. It concludes that strategic and in-
formation constraints tend to make I-LLR lending inefficient, but that
these problems may be mitigated by scaling the LLR function to the re-
gional level.
A lender of last resort (LLR) is any institution, but usually a central
bank, that can provide emergency lending when panic sets in and financial
markets become disrupted so that the ordinary means of accessing credit
have disappeared.210 At the domestic level, the standard theoretical justi-
fication for an LLR turns on the idea that bank runs are multiple equilib-
ria events: a run may develop in which the expectation that some
depositors will panic and withdraw funds makes it rational for every de-
positor to do so, despite a bank’s being fundamentally sound. A lender
that can backstop the banking system will move it from the panicked (bad)
equilibrium to the no-run (good) equilibrium.211 Nineteenth century Brit-
210. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 34, at 110 (providing a definition of
financial panics); id. at 133–35 (noting that J.P. Morgan playing the role of LLR in 1907,
rather than a central bank).
211. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (providing the seminal mathematical exposition of this
model). A role for a LLR as a backstop for bank runs does not necessarily depend on a
model that assumes “panicked” investors are irrational. See Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier
Vives, Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?, 2
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ish financiers and theorists Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot laid out
principles to guide LLR lending, which continue to frame the debate to-
day: a LLR should (1) lend on any collateral that is marketable under
normal economic conditions; (2) at a penalty rate; and (3) these two pre-
ceding rules should be applied mechanically and announced before-
hand.212 The Bagehot principles and modern variants are meant to have
the cumulative effect of allowing merely illiquid banks to gain access to
emergency credit while forcing insolvent banks to fail.213
A LLR function is also theoretically justifiable at the international
level.214 As with individual banks, a state can be subject to runs when
investors lose confidence in the state’s ability to maintain a currency peg
or repay sovereign debt. Therefore, it may be possible for an international
lender of last resort (I-LLR) to provide emergency lending to backstop
temporarily illiquid states facing currency or debt crises and shift interna-
tional investors’ expectations and behavior to the good, no-run
equilibrium.
In practice, when states attempt to provide an I-LLR function, coop-
eration problems and information constraints abound. Specifically, they
appear in three forms: (1) the difficulty of mitigating moral hazard for
direct (states) or indirect (international investors) recipients of an I-LLR’s
loans; (2) incomplete information in determining whether and when emer-
gency loans should be extended; and (3) free riding on contributions to
fund the I-LLR’s pool of available loans. This Section will focus on the
first two points, as the latter free-riding issue raises fairly generic problems
of collective action similar to those presented by providing a cross-border
bailout fund for bank resolutions.215
J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1116, 1116 (2004) (providing a model in which investors are rational
Bayesians with incomplete information and run based only on firm fundamentals).
212. See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MAR-
KET (1873); HENRY THORNTON, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF THE PA-
PER CREDIT OF GREAT BRITAIN (1802); Thomas M. Humphrey, The Classical Concept of the
Lender of Last Resort, 61 FED RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON REV. 2 (1975) (summarizing
the original rules as articulated by Thornton and Bagehot). But see Marvin Goodfriend &
Robert G. King, Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and Central Banking, 74 FED. RES.
BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV. 3 (1988) (providing an influential argument that the LLR
function can be folded into monetary policy, under an assumption of perfectly efficient in-
terbank lending markets). The 2008 crisis appears to contradict Goodfriend & King’s control-
ling assumption, as reflecting by TED-spreads for interbank lending. See Mishkin, supra note
77, at 51, 51 fig. 1 and accompanying text.
213. The distinction is that illiquid banks are essentially sound and would have access to
funding but-for temporary market panic and disruption, while insolvent banks would have
liabilities in excess of assets even during normal economic times. Stanley Fischer, On the
Need for an International Lender of Last Resort, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 87 (1999); Allan H.
Meltzer, What’s Wrong with the IMF? What Would Be Better? 22–23 (Tepper Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper No. 8, 1998) [hereinafter Meltzer Report].
214. See Guillermo Calvo, Lender of Last Resort: Put It on the Agenda!, VOX, March
23, 2009; Fredric S. Mishkin, Lessons from the Asian Crisis, 18 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 709,
716–720 (1999); Fisher, supra note 212, at 100–02.
215. An I-LLR supplies a global public good, because it can potentially reduce systemic
risk in global markets that are prone to destabilizing runs on currencies or sovereign debt. As
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As is the case for a domestic LLR, an I-LLR provides a form of insur-
ance against severe market downturns that leads to moral hazard: inves-
tors will pour money into countries that adopt riskier regulatory or
economic policies, with both the investors and potential borrower country
knowing that some of the downside may be borne by an I-LLR.216 The
domestic regulatory response to moral hazard is to limit banks’ ability to
take excessive risks ex ante by imposing capital requirements and author-
izing supervisors to access banks’ confidential financial information and
take “prompt corrective action” to curb lending practices that are per-
ceived as overly risky.217 The moral hazard problem is more acute at the
international level, however, where the equivalent regulatory tools are
lacking. An I-LLR lacks the in-depth access to states’ financial informa-
tion relative to what domestic supervisors that monitor banks’ safety and
soundness enjoy. In addition, an I-LLR lacks the political authority to
preemptively order potential borrowers—who are, after all, sovereign
states—to pursue less risky macroeconomic policies. In practice, an I-LLR
can attempt to impose regulatory reforms only after a crisis has developed,
by conditioning loans on the borrower state’s adoption of prudent policy
going forward.218 Even then, ensuring meaningful compliance with loan
conditions runs into the same monitoring and enforcement difficulties that
make preemptive supervision problematic in the first place.
While moral hazard kicks in as soon as there is an expectation that
emergency lending may be available, a second problem of incomplete in-
formation appears once a crisis develops and an I-LLR is faced with a
decision over whether to intervene and when.219 For an I-LLR to inter-
vene in an efficient manner, it must determine whether the potential bor-
a consequence of the systemic, non-excludable benefits that an I-LLR provides, each state
will have an incentive to free ride off of the lending resources supplied by other states, with
the result that the I-LLR is under-funded relative to the global optimum. The history of the
IMF bears this out. Depending on the preferred measure, the NIFA-era IMF had a third or a
ninth of the resources relative to what one would expect when extrapolating its funding for-
ward from 1945. See Fisher, supra note 213, at 96. Although voting and quota reforms made
during the heat of the 2008 Crisis substantially increased the IMF’s resources, it declared
further funding needs of $500 billion in January of 2012. Christine Lagarde, Managing Dir.,
IMF, Global Challenges in 2012, Keynote Address at the German Council for Foreign Rela-
tions (Jan. 23, 2012). Perennial controversies over the magnitude and distribution of contri-
butions required of IMF members also reflect the underlying cooperation problem that
funding a global public good entails. See, e.g., Robin Harding, Pressure Mounts on U.S. over
IMF Reform, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2013).
216. Moral hazard is therefore two-sided: there is private international investor moral
hazard and borrower state moral hazard. See Jeanne & Zettelmeyer, supra note 150, at 2.
217. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831(o) (2010) (providing bank supervisors prompt corrective ac-
tion authority).
218. But see Olivier Jeanne, Jonathan D. Ostry, & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, A Theory of
International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/08/236,
2008) (advocating for a policy of “ex ante conditionality” in which the IMF screen countries
for loan eligibility before a crisis hits).
219. Information is “imperfect” but “complete” when parties are simply unaware of all
the actions chosen by other parties. Imperfect information includes knowledge of who the
other parties are, as well as their possible strategies, preference, and payoffs (or, “type”).
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rower state is merely illiquid or instead “insolvent.”220 However, it must
make such a decision with incomplete information concerning a state’s po-
litical willingness and financial ability to meet its obligations if provided
adequate liquidity.221 The opacity of potential borrower states’ financial
status also creates an incentive for borrowers to distort or selectively re-
veal information to the I-LLR in order to indicate that they are illiquid
rather than insolvent, need more aid rather than less, or require loans
sooner rather than later.222 As a result, an I-LLR with incomplete infor-
mation will have difficulty consistently distinguishing interventions that
are welfare-enhancing from those that are wasteful.223
The preceding analysis predicts that an I-LLR will perform more
poorly than its domestic counterparts. An I-LLR will be less effective at
mitigating moral hazard, and may intervene in an awkward or erratic man-
ner due to the poor quality of information it has available. An I-LLR will
also tend to face substantial resources constraints that leave it unable to
lend heavily into large crises. The balance of these factors means that, in
practice, provision of an I-LLR function may well be welfare reducing for
states. As discussed in Section III.A below, an interesting intermediate
institution that may be more effective than a global I-LLR is a regional
LLR that only lends to a geographically limited group of states.
b. Evaluating the IMF as International Lender of Last Resort
Pursuant to its Articles of Agreement, the IMF is authorized to pro-
vide emergency loans to states experiencing financial instability, and it has
been the central institution used to perform an I-LLR function. However,
an evaluation of the IMF’s ability to deal with the strategic problems of
moral hazard, incomplete information, and free riding on its funding
reveals a mixed track record and substantial obstacles to better perform-
ance going forward.
Information is “incomplete” when parties do not necessarily know each other’s strategies,
payoffs, or preferences.
220. Unlike firms, a sovereign cannot technically declare bankruptcy or be considered
insolvent, but governments can still default on obligations to creditors and abandon commit-
ments to a pegged exchange rate through currency devaluation. See REINHART & ROGOFF,
supra note 29, at 3–20, 270–73 (detailing the varieties of sovereign crises).
221. See generally Hassan Naqvi, Banking Crises and the Lender of Last Resort: How
Crucial is the Role of Information? (Feb. 27, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (available
through the National University of Singapore) (providing a formal model of an I-LLR with
incomplete information); see also Se-Jik Kim, Timing of International Bailouts (IMF, Work-
ing Paper No. WP/04/09, 2004).
222. See Olivier Jeanne & Charles Wyplosz, The International Lender of Last Resort:
How Large is Large Enough?, in MANAGING CURRENCY CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 89,
111–13 (Dooley & Frankel eds., 2003) (labeling this as an “agency problem” and characteriz-
ing borrowing states as agents and the IMF as principal.).
223. See Naqvi, supra note 221, at 3; Cécile Bastidon, Philippe Gilles, & Nicolas
Huchet, A Selective Bail-Out International Lending of Last Resort Model, 9 ANNALS OF
ECON. & FIN. 103, 104–05 (2008).
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Moral Hazard
Provision of an I-LLR function creates a moral hazard problem for
both borrower states and their international investor creditors. The IMF
addresses moral hazard through a combination of surveillance of member
states’ risk-taking and by attaching conditions to its loans that require the
borrower to make macroeconomic and regulatory reforms.224 As wielded
by the IMF, neither of these tools is particularly potent, especially when
compared to similar measures employed by domestic financial supervi-
sors.225 A review of the IMF’s ability to mitigate moral hazard through its
surveillance and conditionality programs finds that both policies have
been relatively ineffective and, given the complexity of global finance and
autonomy of sovereign states, cannot easily be improved.
The IMF vows to increase its surveillance efforts in the wake of each
international financial crisis in order to predict and prevent the next disas-
ter, but the track record for these projects is quite poor. After the 1994
Mexican crisis, the IMF announced that it would increase efforts at data
collection, including the quality of data collected and the number of coun-
tries surveilled, with an emphasis on countries at risk.226 These reforms,
however, did not enable the IMF to identify the risk factors that led to the
1997–98 Asian crisis, even though the causes of the Asian crisis closely
paralleled factors at the root of the Mexican crisis just a few years ear-
lier.227 Following the Asian crisis, the IMF redoubled efforts at surveil-
lance by introducing new programs to monitor risk-taking at both the
country-specific and global, systemic level.228 Yet here again, the IMF’s
surveillance programs failed to provide meaningful warnings over the
224. The latter process is commonly referred to as “conditionality.” IMF conditionality
is a perennial target for critics who argue that it amounts to neo-imperialism, is excessively
detailed, or is premised on bad economics. See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZA-
TION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) (providing a prominent presentation of many of these
criticisms). The following analysis argues that conditionality remains ineffective, even when
those concerns are assumed away.
225. Surveillance is a form of oversight analogous to domestic supervision of bank
safety and soundness, while conditionality is roughly equivalent to direct interventions by
bank supervisors, such as Prompt Corrective Action.
226. See Michael Camdessus, Managing Dir., IMF, Drawing Lessons from the Mexican
Crisis: Preventing and Resolving Financial Crises: The Role of the IMF, Address at the 25th
Washington Conference of the Council of the Americas (May 22, 1995), http://www.imf.org/
external/np/sec/mds/1995/mds9508.htm.
227. See Tornell, supra note 47 (arguing that both crises took the same form and shared
similar underlying causes).
228. The IMF’s FSAP program evaluates specific country’s compliance with NIFA-era
best practices standards and produces its findings in reports known as RSOCs. The IMF also
began publishing Global Financial Stability Reports twice a year starting in 2002, and
launched a series of multilateral consultations on global imbalances in 2006. Press Release,
IMF, IMF to Begin Multilateral Consultations with Focus on Global Imbalances, IMF Press
Release No. 06/118 (June 5, 2006).
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magnitude of risks that would eventually manifest themselves in the 2008
Crisis.229
The experience with Iceland, which was subject to annual IMF consul-
tations and reports, is illustrative.230 Iceland had little experience as a fi-
nancial center but, from 2003 to 2008, its banks lent freely into a domestic
housing boom and its financial sector ballooned by entering global mar-
kets for securitized financial assets. By 2007, the U.S. sub-prime market
had already begun to deteriorate, yet the IMF’s 2007 Report failed to ap-
preciate the risks to Iceland’s financial sector; instead, it found that Ice-
land “appears well placed to withstand significant credit and market
shocks,” and that “Iceland’s medium-term prospects remain enviable.”231
Fifteen months later, Iceland nationalized its three largest banks and was
carrying a debt-to-GDP ratio of 800 percent.
In response to the 2008 Crisis, the IMF repeated its historical practice
by rolling out two new surveillance programs, known as the Early Warning
Exercise initiative and the Mutual Assessment Process. But these pro-
grams will once again run into the fact that it is very difficult, arguably
inherently impossible, to predict market crises in advance. The fact that
domestic supervisors, with nearly unlimited access to the books of the fi-
nancial firms they regulated, were unable to appreciate the risks leading
up to 2008 Crisis casts doubt on whether such a task is likely to succeed on
an international scale. An I-LLR must not only process more information
than any single domestic regulator, but must also do so in an environment
where information-gathering requires the cooperation of sovereign states.
And, in the words of a former IMF director: “Experience shows that while
countries tend to be very eager for surveillance over others, they are less
keen on surveillance over themselves.”232 If a lender is to take steps to
mitigate moral hazard, it must have a means of effectively monitoring the
risk-taking of potential borrowers, but the IMF as I-LLR has yet to
achieve that goal.
Conditionality is the IMF’s second tool for reducing moral hazard but
it is also a weak instrument for two reasons. First, conditionality only
serves to discipline state behavior ex post for purposes of repaying the
IMF loan, because emergency loans are only offered after a borrower state
229. See, e.g., Blanchard Sees Global Economy, supra note 4 and accompanying text
(quoting IMF President Olivier Blanchard providing an optimistic view of global financial
stability, based on his expectations over oil price fluctuations, in September of 2008).
230. See Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, Crisis Prevention through Global Surveil-
lance: A Task Beyond the IMF, 30 CATO J. 491, 495–99 (2010).
231. IMF, ICELAND: STAFF REPORT FOR THE 2007 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION, PRE-
PARED BY THE STAFF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE 2007 CONSULTATION WITH ICELAND 2, 17,
IMF County Report 07/295 (Aug. 2007).
232. Camdessus, supra note 226. See also Roberto Marino & Ulrich Volz, A Critical
Review of the IMF’s Tools for Crisis Prevention, German Development Institute 3 (German
Development Institute, Discussion Paper No.4/2012, 2012) (quoting Camdessus and charac-
terizing his statement as “still valid more than fifteen years later”).
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has already taken the risks that led to a crisis.233 The fact that the IMF’s
conditional loans are typically extended at generously low rates and over
terms of only a few years has the further effect that discipline during the
repayment period itself may be minimal.234 It also precludes the ability to
restrain moral hazard ex ante, which may theoretically be possible when
applying the high, “penalty” rates recommended under Bagehot princi-
ples. Perhaps most importantly—to the extent that the borrower state’s
creditors are made whole with funds acquired through the IMF loan—
conditionality does not address “investor moral hazard” at all.235
A second weakness of conditionality is that the IMF does not have the
ability to actually enforce the conditions it purports to impose. For all its
menace, it simply lacks the political capital to force sovereign states to
make sweeping, fundamental changes to their domestic economic and reg-
ulatory policies. As the Meltzer Report bluntly states: “[The IMF] refused
to learn a main lesson of its own past experience—sovereign governments
cannot be compelled to implement programs that they do not favor.”236 In
seeking to coerce adherence to conditionality, basic strategic conflicts of
interest between the IMF and borrower states are often compounded by
high information costs to monitoring. Although simple, transparent
changes to fiscal and tax policies can theoretically be made overnight, fix-
ing a dysfunctional banking system is a protracted process that requires
years of subtle institutional reform that is difficult to measure and evalu-
ate.237 These general enforcement problems are confirmed by anecdotal
accounts as well as quantitative empirical studies, both of which find that
actual compliance with IMF conditionality is far from complete.238
Incomplete Information
The analysis of emergency lending as an interdependence problem
predicts that an I-LLR will lack sufficient information to consistently in-
tervene in sovereign crises of liquidity but not solvency, a distinction that
233. See Oliver Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, International Bailouts, Moral Hazard
and Conditionality, 16 ECON. POL’Y 407, 411 (2001).
234. See id. at 414–15
235. See Jeanne & Zettelmeyer, supra note 150 and accompanying text.
236. See Meltzer Report, supra note 213, at 15 (continuing that, “[p]olicy changes will
not be implemented unless they are supported by local political institutions and their lead-
ers.”). The threat of discontinuing emergency lending is not credible because it amounts to an
admission by the IMF that it has imprudently lent its member states’ money to a renegade.
Id., at 19 (“The IMF lacks adequate mechanisms for enforcing desirable change and avoiding
retrograde actions); id., at 9 (“Cancellation is seen as a failure. Governments understand that
the IMF is reluctant to withhold funds or cancel programs. Hence the threat loses force.”).
237. See Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF’s Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort, 17
CATO J. 275, 279 (1998).
238. See id. at 277; Meltzer Report, supra note 213, at 16–17, 19. See generally Martin C.
Steinwand & Randall W. Stone, The International Monetary Fund: A Review of the Recent
Evidence, 3 REV. INT’L ORG. 123 (2008) (providing a quantitative analysis); James R. Vree-
land, IMF Program Compliance: Aggregate Index Versus Policy Specific Research Strategies, 1
REV. INT’L ORG. 359 (2006) (same).
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is necessary for such interventions to be efficient. Information concerning
the full scope of a state’s liabilities and its political commitment to reform
can be difficult to interpret, revealed in a partial and opportunistic man-
ner, or outright fabricated. A review of IMF-administered bailouts indi-
cates that the bulk of its lending has not been directed at temporary
liquidity crises.239 This is evident as an initial matter, because cases in
which investor panic leads to short-term liquidity shortfalls of otherwise
economically healthy sovereigns should constitute a relatively rare subset
of all sovereign financial crises.240 In contrast, the IMF has lent freely into
nearly every sovereign debt or currency crisis since the 1980s.
An early example is Mexico’s debt crisis of the 1980s. In December of
1982, when the IMF extended a $3.9 billion loan to Mexico, the expecta-
tion that the funds would restore investor confidence and backstop a no-
run equilibrium proved incorrect.241 Instead, a “Lost Decade” ensued, in
which multiple rounds of negotiation failed to cleanly resolve how to
restructure the obligations to foreign investors that Mexico and other
Latin American countries were simply unable to meet. Liquidity crises,
almost by definition, do not last a decade.
A subsequent test came during the 1990s financial crises in Mexico
and Asia. Both were classic “twin crises,” in which a country’s need to
extend credit to distressed domestic banks is incompatible with its commit-
ment to support a fixed or pegged exchange rate with higher domestic
interest rates.242 Incomplete information looms large in these cases, be-
cause official government statistics do not reflect the full financial difficul-
ties facing borrower countries with off-balance sheet liabilities in the form
of deeply insolvent banking sectors. Accordingly, the Asian and Mexican
crises initially presented themselves as speculative runs on currency pegs,
but recapitalization of their hopelessly insolvent financial sectors proved
the deeper, less temporary problem. In 1995, Mexico received $17.7 billion
from the IMF in connection with efforts to support the peso, but ulti-
mately had to recapitalize its banking sector at a cost of 10 to 15 percent of
GDP.243 The depth of insolvency of the banking sectors involved in the
1997–98 Asian crises was arguably even worse.244
239. See generally Calomiris, supra note 237.
240. See Meltzer Report, supra note 213; Mishkin, supra note 214, at 718 (“[T]he lender-
of-last-resort role will be more successful in promoting financial stability if it is implemented
only very infrequently.”).
241. See generally Geske Dijkstra & Niels Hermes, Debt Relief and Economic Recov-
ery in Latin America: Lessons for HIPCs, Presentation at the XXII International Congress of
the Latin American Studies Association (Sept. 6–8, 2011).
242. See REINHARDT & ROGOFF, supra note 29, at 270–73.
243. Gerard Caprio, Jr. & Daniela Klingebiel, Bank Insolvency: Cross-Country Experi-
ence 15 (World Bank Policy Research Dep’t, Working Paper No. 1620, 1996).
244. The costs as a percentage of GDP of recapitalizing Asia’s banking sectors has been
estimated at 56.7% for Indonesia, 31.2% for Korea, and 43.8% for Thailand. Luc Laeven &
Fabian Valencia, Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database 32 tbl.1 (IMF, Working Paper
No. 08/224, 2008).
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Other episodes underline the IMF’s trouble interpreting the compli-
cated financial and political environment in borrower countries. For exam-
ple, the IMF extended a $22.6 billion loan to Russia in 1998 that was
premised on an exchange rate policy that it expected to remain “broadly
unchanged during the remainder of 1998.”245 This quickly proved to be a
miscalculation. Three days after receiving the loan, Russia devalued the
ruble by 34 percent and declared a ninety-day moratorium on its debt pay-
ments. Another misstep was the series of billion-dollar loans that the IMF
extended to Argentina over the course of 2000–2001, which were followed
by the collapse of the Argentine peso. In retrospect, the IMF admitted
that it had failed to appreciate the inevitability of Argentina’s devaluation
and should not have extended loans in the first place.246
The 2008 Crisis primarily involved runs on sovereign debt, rather than
on currency pegs. But here again, there have been instances of massive
IMF lending that was unrelated to temporary liquidity shortfalls. Most no-
tably, in 2010 Greece was extended two loans by the IMF in coordination
with EU entities, but nevertheless defaulted on its sovereign debt in
2012.247 Greece is a paradigmatic example of incomplete information, in
which a borrower country can feign solvency through opaque or outright
fraudulent public accounting: the Greek government’s official projection
for its 2009 budget deficit as of September 2009 was 3.7 percent, a figure
disappointingly short of the eventual 15.4 percent deficit.248 Thus, record
of interventions over the past three decades does not reflect a willingness
or ability on the part of the IMF to discriminate between crises of liquidity
and cases where states will inevitably lapse on sovereign debt or exchange
rate commitments.
Summary
A sound theoretical case can be made that, if states can cooperate to
pool resources and establish an I-LLR entity, liquidity crises in currency
and sovereign debt markets may be contained. However, the experience
with the IMF illustrates many of the problems facing an I-LLR in practice.
The IMF has not been able to effectively monitor risk taking in global
financial markets or impose conditionality sufficient to curtail moral haz-
ard; neither has it skillfully distinguished between cases when emergency
lending is warranted and those when it is not. The profound informational
245. Press Release, IMF, IMF Approves Augmentation of Russia Extended Arrange-
ment and Credit under CCFF, IMF Press Release No. 98/31 (July 20, 1998).
246. POL’Y DEV. & REV. DEP’T, IMF, LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS IN ARGENTINA ¶ 89
(2003) (“An important consideration that has to guide the Fund’s decision-making process
and that was clearly underscored by the Argentine experience is that, in a situation in which
the debt dynamics are clearly unsustainable, the IMF should not provide its financing. To the
extent that such financing helps stave off a needed debt restructuring, it only compounds the
ultimate cost of such a restructuring.”).
247. See Greece’s Default: The Wait is Over, ECONOMIST (May 17, 2012).
248. See EUR. ECON. ADVISORY GRP. [EEAG], THE EEAG REPORT ON THE EURO-
PEAN ECONOMY, GOVERNING EUROPE 97, 111 (2011).
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constraints and incentives for opportunistic state behavior in the I-LRR
context caution skepticism over whether the international architecture for
emergency lending at the global level can be substantially improved in the
near future. The partial displacement of the IMF by European institutions
during the Eurozone debt crisis reflects these difficulties, as well as the
advantages of regional LLRs where there is already a deep history of re-
gional cooperation.
III. IMPLICATIONS
This Article’s argument carries implications for practical policy discus-
sion as well as the theoretical literature on international financial regula-
tion and public international law. Part A of this Section evaluates policy
options for further modifying the international financial architecture; Part
B addresses the theoretical literature.
A. Policy: Implications for the Design of International
Financial Regulation
1. A World Financial Organization
The weaknesses of the NIFA, in its original and post-2008 forms, raise
the question of whether some alternative architecture may work better.
Several commentators have called for a “new Bretton Woods,”249 which
would centralize and legalize international regulation of finance in a
World Financial Organization (WFO) similar in structure to the World
Trade Organization (WTO). That position implies that the interdepen-
dence problems posed by international finance can be overcome by choos-
ing a bolder institutional structure. This Article’s analysis cautions against
such an approach, and contends that advocates for a WFO work off of a
false analogy to the WTO that relies on two mistaken premises.
The first premise mischaracterizes the development of international
trade law, and holds that the WTO represents a story of previously unsuc-
cessful attempts at decentralized cooperation that were corrected by an
international body capable of binding states to their commitments. The
problem with this assertion is that it overlooks considerable pre-WTO de-
velopments. Prior to the establishment of the WTO in 1994, international
trade was not a chaotic free-for-all conducted in a legal vacuum. Rather,
pursuant to the GATT treaty, the international law of trade provided de-
tailed, binding rules as well as an informal mediation procedure that
served as a forum for states to dispute alleged breaches of those rules. In
the event that a party was engaged in illegal protectionism and breached
its obligations under the GATT, the customary international law of state
responsibility provided remedies for aggrieved trading partners, including
authorization of retaliatory self-help measures.250 As with the GATT, the
249. See supra note 13. See also Carlos Mauricio S. Mirandola, Solving Global Financial
Imbalances: A Plan for a World Financial Authority, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 535 (2011).
250. As a matter of public international law, retaliatory countermeasures may be taken
against states in breach of international law until compliance is resumed by the breaching
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WTO and its Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) does not have independent
enforcement authority and does not directly compel states to reduce barri-
ers to trade.251 Instead, when the WTO DSB finds a violation of trading
rules, it asks the respondent state to desist from the practice at issue and
authorizes the complainant state to take action if the respondent does not
comply.252 Thus, aggrieved states possess no new remedies or greater pow-
ers of enforcement than they did under the previous GATT regime. The
value added by the WTO, then, is in its information and reputation pro-
ducing function, whereby it acts as an impartial third party that verifies
and publicizes legal violations between trading partners.253 In short, the
GATT was successful, and the WTO’s dispute settlement function aug-
ments that success, because certain features of international trade make it
amendable to decentralized enforcement in the first instance.254
The second premise of the WFO proposal mischaracterizes interna-
tional finance, and holds that it is sufficiently similar to international trade
for the WTO to be emulated by a new body regulating finance. But as the
interdependence problem analysis of this Article suggests, the conditions
for cooperation present in trade are less prevalent in finance, and con-
structing a WFO will not change that fact. With international trade, rules
are simple, monitoring violations is straightforward, and reciprocal en-
forcement is possible because the relevant externalities are bilateral and
imposed repeatedly over time.255 State A’s import tariff raises the cost of
State B’s exports by a measurable dollar amount that is imposed on a con-
tinuous basis. In response, State B is often willing and able to take tit-for-
tat retaliatory measures against State A—under the auspices of the
GATT, with the WTO’s authorization, or otherwise.
state. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., arts. 49–53, UN Doc A/56/10; GAOR,
56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
251. Cf. Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is
More,. 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 416, 417 (1996) (observing that, like the GATT, the WTO has “no
jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no truncheons or tear gas”).
252. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. 22.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (allowing complaining parties to “request authorization from the
DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations
under the covered agreements”).
253. See Andrew Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 171, 179 (2008) (“[The WTO’s] sole contribution to the dispute is information
concerning what happened, what law governs, and how the law applies to the facts. Whatever
impact international tribunals have, then, must be the result of the ruling itself and the infor-
mation in that ruling.”); Matthew C. Turk, Why Does the Complainant Always Win at the
WTO?: A Reputation-Based Theory of Litigation at the World Trade Organization, 31 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 385, 385 (2011) (explaining the WTO DSB complainants’ surprising, 90 per-
cent “win-rate” as a product of the WTO’s information-producing function).
254. Cf. Arvind Subramanian & Shang-Jin Wei, The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly
But Unevenly, 72 J. INT’L ECON. 151 (2007); Andrew K. Rose, Do We Really Know that the
WTO Increases Trade?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 98 (2004).
255. See Posner & Sykes, supra note 178, at 46.
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However, none of these features apply to finance. Global financial sta-
bility is affected by spillovers between states that are systemic and diffuse,
rather than bilateral.256 Monitoring breaches of international financial
agreements is extremely complicated. Regulatory laxness on capital ade-
quacy, for example, means that one state’s banking sector can take on
risks that subtly undermine the stability of counterparties across the globe.
An international lender of last resort is also subject to substantial informa-
tion constraints that make it difficult to determine the timing, magnitude,
and necessity of emergency lending interventions. Finally, cooperation on
cross-border bank resolution differs from that on trade in that it cannot be
reinforced by indefinitely repeated interactions, because crises are spo-
radic and present a strategic endgame for governments when they occur.
The distinction between international trade and finance is best illus-
trated by an agreement that is already part of the WTO itself, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).257 The GATS Financial Services
Agreement covers finance and banking services, but in contrast to the
WTO’s success in areas such as trade in goods or intellectual property,
WTO members have yet to implement the GATS provisions that relate to
finance in any concrete manner.258 The fate of GATS provisions relating
to finance is consistent with the analysis above: despite being embedded in
the legal apparatus of the WTO, the underlying economic features of the
financial industry make it less amenable to international regulatory coop-
eration than is the case for trade.
Problems of monitoring and enforcement aside, what stability-enhanc-
ing rules would a hypothetical WFO apply? While the underlying interde-
pendence problems of global finance are identifiable, formulating optimal
policy with respect to them is not easy.259 Three generations of Basel Ac-
cords have tinkered with complex capital adequacy rules, with mixed re-
sults. IMF bailouts have been subject to serious criticism, and
implementing a policy that captures the conditions under which an inter-
national lender of last resort can successfully intervene is a daunting task.
Specifying how a universal cross-border resolution mechanism would iden-
tify, prioritize, and adjudicate claims against a failing G-SIFI would be a
controversial process as well. Uncertainty over how to get the details of
these policies right would not necessarily be reduced by creating a new
international organization.
256. See Eichengreen, supra note 13, at 19 (“[I]n the case of finance, injury is likely to
be more diffuse [than in trade]; the adverse financial repercussions are likely to be more
widespread.”).
257. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1995, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S.
183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
258. See Pan, supra note 156, at 251–52.
259. This is yet another feature of finance that contrasts with trade, where there is a
rough consensus that the globally optimal rule is to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers to
trade as close to zero as possible. See Richard Alston, J.R. Kearl & Michael B. Vaughan, Is
There a Consensus Among Economists in the 1990’s?, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 203, 204 (1992).
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Despite these difficulties, proposals for a WFO are not surprising and
exemplify a general way of thinking about international law that is com-
mon in the scholarship. The typical argument proceeds by three steps: (1)
identifying an international policy problem or a global public good that is
under-produced;260 (2) admitting that a decentralized approach to solving
the problem is failing or will fail;261 and (3) recommending a new global
body possessing plenary enforcement power that will compel states to
adopt optimal policies for production of the global public good at issue.262
The analytical mistake undermining the WFO proposal is forgetting that
in many contexts, including finance, accepting Step 2 implies that execut-
ing Step 3 will be very difficult to do in practice.263
What should be concluded from the NIFA experience, and from the
analysis of this Article, is that international agreements and institutions
are largely endogenous products of the political-economic realities of the
international state system, rather than external variables that can be dialed
up or down to mollify the political and strategic conflicts that states face.
For the time being, then, a radical overhaul of the international financial
architecture is neither feasible nor—given the uncertainty over optimal
policy described above—likely desirable.
From an even broader view, achieving financial stability may depend
on a balanced expansion of the global economy, rather than feats of inter-
260. See, e.g., Eichengreen, supra note 13, at 18 (providing, “multiple examples of how
problems arising in connection with supervision and regulation in one country can infect
financial systems in other countries.”); Pan, supra note 156, at 264–69, 273 (arguing that the
“problem of cross-border supervision” must be addressed at the international level).
261. See, e.g., Eichengreen, supra note 13, at 18 (“[M]echanisms for ensuring that na-
tional decisions regarding [financial] regulation are taken with external as well as domestic
consequences in mind remain inadequate.”); Pan, supra note 156, at 246 (“[T]he limitations
of the international financial architecture Falseleft unresolved the problems of prudential
supervision of cross-border financial institutions and systemic risk regulation.”).
262. See, e.g., Eichengreen, supra note 13, at 19 (“The WFO would define obligations
for its members . . . appoint independent panels of experts to determine whether countries
were in compliance with those obligations . . . [and] authorize the imposition of sanctions
against countries that failed to comply.”); Pan, supra note 156, at 246–47 (advocating “the
creation of an international body that has the power and resources to supervise cross-border
financial institutions, demand action by national supervisors, promulgate supervisory stan-
dards, conduct inspections, and initiate enforcement proceedings.”).
263. Ironically, the desire for an apolitical, technocratic policymaking that is embodied
in Step 3 seems to be what animated the NIFA in the first place, and the lackluster results
have frustrated some of its more sophisticated advocates. Compare Walter Mattli & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Law and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett, 49 INT’L ORG.
183, 189 (1995) (“It is entirely rational for individuals to decide to be governed by a set of
rules, applicable and ascertainable to all on the basis of logic, consistency, and ordinary
meaning. To so decide is to hive off a domain from pure political struggle. It is also to em-
power lawyers and judges, whose power derives from their special expertise.”), with Institu-
tional Performance, supra note 55, at 500 (“Bureaucratization [through trans-governmental
networks] has had little to say about the crisis. It has not provided a response through the
usual international vehicles, and the cosmopolitan comparative (and, of course, harmonizing)
mission of the networks has been found to be wanting. Instead, the response to that crisis has
been politicized through the G20.”).
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national regulatory engineering or institutional design.264 For example,
some econometric studies find that growing current account imbalances
are close predictors of banking crises.265 Others argue that imbalances in
net capital flows between the U.S. and China (abetted by both) caused the
former to be flooded with cheap credit that fueled financial risk taking.266
Another potential ongoing risk is the extreme indebtedness of several
Eurozone states and the continued fragility of their banking sectors, which
the ECB has encouraged to hold large amounts of risky European sover-
eign debt.267 China’s increasingly apparent internal misallocation of capi-
tal could pose a threat as well. And, any of the above268 may be triggered
or compounded by dramatic fluctuations in global markets for important
assets or commodities that are difficult to predict.  Unfortunately, it is
hard to imagine concerted policies that could correct these imbalances,
which to a certain degree depend on the vagaries of the historical develop-
ment of capitalism that are in part beyond any state or multilateral organi-
zation’s control.269
264. See generally MICHAEL PETTIS, THE GREAT REBALANCING: TRADE, CONFLICT,
AND THE PERILOUS ROAD AHEAD FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (2013); RAGHURAM G.
RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY
(2010).
265. See R. Barrell, E.P. Davis, D. Karim & I. Liadze, The Impact of Global Imbal-
ances: Does the Current Account Balance Help to Predict Banking Crises in OECD Coun-
tries? (Nat’l Inst. of Econ. & Soc. Research, Discussion Paper No. 351, 2010); REINHART &
ROGOFF, supra note 29, at 218–19 Fig.13.5; Carmen Reinhart & Vincent Reinhart, Capital
Flow Bonanzas, an Encompassing View of the Past and Present (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 14321, 2008); Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, Is the 2007 US Sub-
Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison, 98 AM. ECON.
REV. 339 (2008).
266. This is Bernanke and Greenspan’s “savings glut” hypothesis, with “China” serving
as a metonym for Asian countries with high savings rates and large dollar-denominated
reserves. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, The Global Savings Glut and the U.S.
Current Account Deficit, Speech to the Virginia Association of Economics (Mar. 10, 2005);
Greenspan, supra note 141, at 202–04. See also EICHENGREEN, supra note 31, at 112–18;
Harm Bandholz, Joerg Clostermann & Frank Seitz, Explaining the US Bond Yield Conun-
drum, 19 APPLIED FIN. ECON. 539 (2009) (attempting to quantify the savings glut’s effect on
interest rates); Francis E. Warnock & Veronica Cacdac Warnock, International Capital Flows
and U.S. Interest Rates, 28 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 903 (2009) (same).
267. E.g., Hans-Werner Sinn & Akos Valentinyi, European Imbalances, VOX, Mar. 9,
2013 (arguing that “a credible strategy for getting the Eurozone back on track needs to ad-
dress the problem of its large internal imbalances”).
268. This list is meant to be illustrative of the  kinds of risks that can lead to interna-
tional financial disruption, rather than serve as a specific set of prognoses.
269. Cf. GREGORY CLARK, A FAREWELL TO ALMS: A BRIEF ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
THE WORLD, 212–14 (2007) (espousing a strong form of such a historical-materialist view);
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION,
AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES, 36–74 (1982) (same); Karl Marx, Preface to A Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS, ED. LAWRENCE H. SI-
MON 209, 211 (1994) (same).
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2. Incremental Policy Solutions
Given the impracticality of fundamental reform on the scale of a
WFO, what can be done to provide better prospects for global financial
stability? Two generic kinds of incremental policies, which are less ambi-
tious than attempts to directly solve cooperation problems on a global
scale, may be promising. The first is to find solutions to coordination
games that are embedded in larger cooperation problems. Typically, this
will involve agreements that stipulate the form that cooperative action
should take.270 A second kind of intermediate reform is to scale coopera-
tion projects from the global to the regional level, where information con-
straints are less severe, incentives to free ride are reduced, and states often
have a richer history of interaction. Both of these regulatory strategies can
be applied across a variety of policy areas, but a prominent example of
each follows.
a. Harmonization of Bank Resolution Plans
Embedded within the daunting cooperation problem presented by a
universal approach to liquidating the assets of failed, cross-border banks is
a more manageable harmonization problem relating to resolution. The
staggering complexity of G-SIFIs bewildered regulators during the 2008
Crisis and impeded efforts to identify and execute the most efficient
means of resolution. In response, domestic financial reforms have included
requirements that firms develop “living wills” or “resolution plans,” which
specify the institution’s corporate structure, identify counterparties, and
provide a rough roadmap for the unwinding of assets.271 If states can coor-
dinate to standardize the form that resolution plans take, they may
thereby streamline the complexity of regulatory compliance across bor-
ders, and reduce the transaction costs of engaging in international finance.
In addition, international harmonization of living wills would facilitate co-
operation during emergency cross-border resolutions by allowing regula-
tors in different countries to operate from a common factual
understanding.272
Resolution Plans are truly standards in the narrow sense defined in
Section II.A, and an analogy can be made to harmonization of accounting
standards: resolution plans are documents that essentially “measure” a
firm’s structure and interconnection with other firms, just as accounting
rules measure corporate assets and liabilities. As is the case with harmoni-
zation of other standards, negotiations to develop a common international
resolution plan should take the form of a battle-of-the-sexes game, with no
270. See generally SCHELLING, supra note 96.
271. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank, § 165(d).
272. See Emilios Avgouleas, Charles Goodhart, & Dirk Schoenmaker, Bank Resolution
Plans as Catalyst for Global Financial Reform, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 210, 211–12 (2013) (argu-
ing for the importance of international resolution plans, and contending that they can serve
as an impetus for more ambitious regulatory reforms). The claim here is only that coopera-
tion will be more efficient ceterus paribus, for any given political appetite for cooperation—
not that harmonized living wills can remove strategic conflicts of interest between states.
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party facing an incentive for opportunistic non-cooperation once an agree-
ment has been made. In addition, because resolution plans are an essen-
tially novel regulatory tool, negotiations over a common standard should
not be impeded by the presence of parties with high switching costs, as is
the case in other harmonization contexts such as insurance.273 These con-
siderations suggest optimism over the ability for states to coordinate on
international resolution plans.
Since the 2008 Crisis, institutional groundwork has been laid that may
serve as a basis for harmonizing resolution plans. The G20, at its Pitts-
burgh summit, explicitly noted the importance of resolution plans for its
agenda on further cooperation on cross-border resolution. And although
the development of such plans has initially taken place at the domestic
level, the Basel Committee and the BIS are actively monitoring the struc-
ture of domestic plans with an eye toward later harmonization.274 Admit-
tedly, it is too early to know for certain whether these efforts will result in
concrete action or meaningful coordination. However, harmonized resolu-
tion plans do not appear to be plagued by the strategic issues facing a
universal resolution mechanism, and could serve to make the regulation
and potential liquidation of G-SIFIs substantially more manageable.275
b. Regional Lenders of Last Resort
An interesting intermediate institution is a regional LLR that only
lends to a geographically limited group of states. A regional LLR would
face the same interdependence problems as an I-LLR, but potentially to a
lesser degree. Information and enforcement costs could be lower, as moni-
toring compliance and policing moral hazard would take place among a
smaller group of states that likely have more homogenous economies and
deeper political-economic ties. Concern with free riding could also be re-
duced, due to the lower number of parties and possible presence of a state
that is powerful enough relative to its regional counterparts to assume the
costs of supplying local public goods. As a result, under some conditions,
scaling a LLR function to the regional level may tip the balance of costs
and benefits into net positive territory for participating states.276
273. While the United States has already implemented resolution plans under Dodd-
Frank, those requirements were crafted in the context of international reports on the same
topic and do not vary widely from other proposals. See FIN. STABILITY BD., RESOLUTION OF
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: PROGRESS REPORT 9 (2012), available
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031aa.pdf. At the same time,
states with globally interconnected financial sectors stand to gain the most from standardiza-
tion of resolution plans, because their domestic firms engage in relatively higher volumes of
transactions with cross-border counterparties. See DREZNER, supra note 7, at 32 (“Economic
globalization increases the gross rewards to policy coordination.”).
274. See CBBRG REPORT, supra note 197, at 35–38.
275. Herring, supra note 125, at 14–17 (describing seven guiding principles for effective
resolution plans); see generally, Avgouleas et al., supra note 272.
276. For similar reasons, regionalism may be an increasing trend in the area of interna-
tional trade as well. See Stephen J. Powell, Is the WTO Quietly Fading Away?: The New
Regionalism of Global Trade Rules, 9 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 261 (2011).
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Efforts of the European Commission (EC) and European Central
Bank (ECB) during the European sovereign debt crisis provide the clear-
est example of the potential advantages of a regional LLR. The EC is ca-
pable of closely monitoring Eurozone borrower countries, which share a
common institutional and regulatory structure. It also has a substantial ca-
pacity to curb moral hazard through threats of ejection from the Eurozone
or other drastic measures.277 In a feat that IMF conditionality could never
aspire to, the prime ministers of Greece and Italy, whom Brussels did not
perceive to be reliable partners in lending, were pressured out of power in
2011.278 The two EU entities have also been able to draw on several de-
cades of deep legal integration to pool a greater amount of emergency aid
than would otherwise be achievable by the IMF acting alone.279 In part,
this is due to the fact that the Eurozone arguably now contains a dominant
economy, Germany, which has the capacity to supply regional public
goods regardless of the incentive for smaller Eurozone countries to free
ride. Indeed, after a series of ineffective bailouts co-funded by the IMF,
yields on Spanish and Italian sovereign bonds only began to fall when the
ECB—with what amounted to a de facto guarantee of Eurozone debts by
Germany—announced that it would buy up sovereign Eurozone debt in
unlimited quantities.280
Outside of Europe, other regional LLR initiatives have been estab-
lished in recent years as well. These include the Chiang Mai Initiative
(CMI) in East Asia, the Fondo Latinamericano de Reservas (FLAR) in
Latin America, and the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF).281 The FLAR and
AMF pool too few resources ($3 billion and $2 billion, respectively) to be
meaningful substitutes to the IMF at this stage, but the CMI has a non-
trivial $120 billion available.282 The CMI was not heavily relied on by its
members during the 2008 Crisis, however, and its significance remains un-
certain.283 While it is likely too early to provide a conclusive evaluation of
277. See, e.g., Michelle Martin & Paul Carrel, Greek Exit Manageable but Not Prefera-
ble: ECB’s Asmussen, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/08/20/us-ecb-asmussen-idUSBRE87I0CV20120820.
278. Europe Against the People?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2011 (“First George Papan-
dreou, the Greek prime minister, promised to resign, and then Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi did
the same. Both leaders have been in trouble for some time, but the immediate cause of their
downfall is plain: the ultimatum they received from euro-zone leaders at the G20 summit in
Cannes.”).
279. See Franz Seitz & Thomas Jost, The Role of the IMF in the European Debt Crisis 4,
8–9 (Univ. of Applied Sci. (FH), Discussion Paper No. 32, 2012).
280. See Jones & Steen, supra note 82 (quoting the ECB Chairman Draghi declaring it
will “do ‘whatever it takes’” to save the euro).
281. See Barry Eichengreen, Regional Funds: Paper Tigers or Tigers with Teeth?, in
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL LIQUIDITY ARRANGEMENTS, 39, 39 (2010).
282. See id.
283. Obstacles to its future relevance include key members such as China, Japan, and
South Korea holding large amounts of foreign reserves as a form of self-insurance, and lim-
ited efforts to establish surveillance and conditionality policies that would accompany poten-
tial CMI lending. See id., at 47.
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such programs, these regional arrangements may be less susceptible to in-
formation and cooperation constraints than a truly global LLR. On the
other hand, it should not be surprising if the non-European LLR programs
remain marginal for the time being. The theoretical advantages of region-
alism discussed above only apply to the extent that there is significantly
deeper economic integration and institutional cooperation at the regional
rather than international level. Europe provides just such a case, most im-
portantly due to its common currency, but those features are present to a
lesser degree among countries in Latin America or East Asia.
B. Theory: Implications for the International Law Literature
1. Response to Critiques of the Rational State Approach
In addition to policy considerations, this Article also carries implica-
tions for the theoretical literature on international financial regulation and
public international law generally, some of which have already been sug-
gested in the WFO discussion above. The primary lesson is the usefulness
of the basic state-centered, rational choice approach, which has been criti-
cized from several quarters as lacking explanatory power. Recent work on
international financial regulation [IFR] has argued that “rational choice
theory on its own provides an unsatisfactory account of IFR,” and that the
putatively rationalist “assumption that IFR is optimally designed [‘to max-
imize joint gains for states’] predisposes scholars to neglect issues of com-
pliance and effectiveness.”284 As a result, the argument proceeds,
rationalist accounts need to be replaced, or at least supplemented with
other theoretical paradigms.285
However, this Article employs a rational choice approach that is cen-
trally concerned with compliance and seeks to specify when attempts at
international cooperation will be effective at solving interdependence
problems in finance and when they will not. The criticism of the rational
choice framework misses the mark because it misunderstands the theory
to claim or entail that rational actors will always maximize joint gains. But
a corollary of the Coase Theorem is that rational actors will not exhaust
available gains from trade whenever transaction costs are positive.286
There is a body of economic theory, dedicated to specifying the conditions
for market failure, that is concerned with this exact result.287 Indeed, the
central lesson of the prisoner’s dilemma is that individually rational actors
284. Verdier, supra note 9, at 1424–25 (continuing: “Therefore, a satisfactory theory of
IFR cannot avoid asking to what extent it actually requires states to depart from what they
would otherwise do, and whether they comply when faced with competing pressures.”).
285. See id. at 1424.
286. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960); see also
Avinash Dixit & Mancur Olson, Does Voluntary Participation Undermine the Coase Theo-
rem?, 76 J. PUB. ECON. 309, 310 (2000).
287. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970); A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling,
87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping,
41 REV. ECON. STUD. 219 (1974); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imper-
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will sometimes not achieve collectively rational (i.e. joint gains maximiz-
ing) outcomes.288 Moreover, the problem of cooperating to maximize joint
gains is more acute at the international level than it is domestically, be-
cause there is no world government that can enforce contracts (treaties)
between states, or levy taxes to spend on international public goods, or
redistribute joint gains from cooperation in a manner that is Pareto-
improving.289
Failure to appreciate the fact that rational states will not necessarily
exhaust opportunities for international cooperation often leads to forays
in theoretically alternatives that have less explanatory power. One alterna-
tive approach uses the concept of historical path dependence. While diffi-
cult to rigorously define,290 path dependence refers to a process whereby
certain self-reinforcing features of initial conditions or early sequences of
events, such as increasing returns to scale, can have a lasting effect on the
distribution of potential future outcomes, or “historical paths.”291 Theo-
ries of path dependence have been used to argue that the bargain struck at
Bretton Woods, in which no international institution was created specifi-
cally to regulate private international finance, triggered an inefficient path
dependence dynamic that explains why there is currently no formal inter-
national financial organization that administers globally optimal
regulation.292
A historical path dependence theory of post-Bretton Woods “lock-in”
implies that the institutional structure established at that meeting in the
aftermath of WWII would stubbornly resist change. This, however, is con-
tradicted by parallel developments in the cognate areas of trade and mon-
fect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 3939 (1981); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Econo-
mies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 J. ECON. 229 (1986).
288. Cf. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR, 140 (1978)
(“Economist are familiar with systems that lead to aggregate results that the individual
neither intends nor needs to be aware of, results that sometimes have no recognizable coun-
terpart at the level of the individual.”).
289. Since cooperation under anarchy is voluntary, states cannot form cooperative ven-
tures that improve the aggregate welfare of the group unless each state—or at least each
relatively powerful state—in the group is made better off by its participation in the venture.
Cf. Shepsle, supra note 6, at 9 (“A feature of all collective action from a purely rational
perspective is that outcome are not Pareto optimal.”).
290. The fuzziness of path dependence is often taken to extremes and used to stand for
the truism that historical events affect one another. Scott E. Page, Essay: Path Dependence, 1
Q. J. POL. SCI. 87, 87 (2006) (“Th[e] wider application of path dependence has dulled its
value. In becoming a trendy way to say that history matters, path dependence no longer
provides any analytic leverage.”).
291. See id.; Orfeo Fioretos, Historical Institutionalism in International Relations, 65
INT’L ORG. 367 (2011) (providing an application of path dependence to international rela-
tions); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000) (providing the seminal theoretical exposition); Jacob Hacker, The
Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of
British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 57 (1998) (providing the
seminal case study).
292. See Verdier, supra note 9, at 1424–27.
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etary coordination, where international regimes have evolved dramatically
in responses to changes in the global economy since Bretton Woods.293
Path dependence is also inapposite for explaining the current financial ar-
chitecture. This is because the theory implies that small details in initial
conditions can be surprisingly persistent, but does not suggest that large
shocks to a system cannot shift the course of institutional development;
and, the 2008 Crisis was the largest shock to global finance in eighty
years.294 The response to the 2008 Crisis produced Dodd-Frank, for exam-
ple, which is commonly seen as most expansive piece of financial regula-
tion since the New Deal legislation that established modern U.S. banking
and securities law. As shown in the discussion of proposals for a WFO
above, the rational choice analysis provided in this Article can explain why
states have not developed institutions capable of facilitating optimal coop-
eration on finance—despite the historic, path-breaking events of 2008—
without stumbling into the evidentiary problems facing the path depen-
dence hypothesis.
Another common alternative approach looks to the incentives of sub-
state actors, such as interest groups, to explain patterns of international
cooperation that are claimed to be otherwise inexplicably irrational from
the perspective of states.295 Interest group level analyses are potentially
valuable supplements to a rational-state approach, because they can pro-
vide specifics concerning the terms that states prefer be incorporated into
international agreements. For example, an interest group analysis can be
useful in determining which standards are likely to be harmonized as part
of a coordination game, or which definitions of regulatory capital are pur-
sued during the negotiation of capital adequacy agreements.296
At the same time, interest group or other sub-state explanations may
flounder when they seek to displace the unitary state assumption by claim-
ing, for instance, that in the “decentralized regulatory space [of interna-
tional finance], the national–international dichotomies associated with
public international law do not apply.”297 Many of these studies seek to
293. Trade law moved from substantially non-existent at Bretton Woods, to treaty-
based with the GATT, to being administered through an international organization, the
WTO. International monetary coordination was initially administered through a formal inter-
national organization, the IMF, but was abandoned completely in 1973 with the switch to
floating exchange rates. See supra Sections I.A, B.
294. In path dependence jargon, one would say that both the 2008 Crisis and Bretton
Woods represent “critical junctures” with lasting effects. See Pierson, supra note 289, at 251.
295. See Gadinis, supra note 9, at 449 (“Existing theories cannot explain why states
have agreed to coordinate in some areas of financial regulation but have maintained diver-
gent laws in others.”); Simmons, supra note 17, at 590 (“Nor are prevalent theories of cooper-
ation very useful in explaining the variance we see in the role and strength of international
institutions in this area . . . why are they much less developed in the regulation of financial
markets than in trade?”); see also SINGER, supra note 17, at 2–3; Verdier, supra note 9, at
1422–24.
296. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 17; TARULLO, supra note 36.
297. See How International Financial Law Works, supra note 9, at 273. Analogy can be
made to a model in which firms seek to maximize profits. Such a model will not be able to
predict in great detail which products firms will produce in seeking profits, or which firms will
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demonstrate such a point by giving a detailed description of a handful of
cases, finding some common characteristics across the cases, and back-fit-
ting these characteristics as explanatory variables in a theory that predicts
the case studies. This type of exercise runs into two problems: (1) because
the variables identified are custom fit to explain the case studies, they are
contradicted by many cases not examined by the author; or (2) factually
rich explanations of the cases yield so many subjective and qualitative
variables (and caveats as to when they apply) that they have no observable
implications, and amount to descriptions of unique events.298
The safer and simpler approach used in this Article proceeds by as-
suming that “[d]omestic factors account for [state] preference formation,
but not the outcomes of international bargaining.”299 By applying this
framework to the four most pressing financial interdependence problems,
this Article seeks to demonstrate that “national-international dichoto-
mies” remain critical for explaining the most important features of inter-
national cooperation on finance.
2. A Critique of Transgovernmental Networks
and Soft Law Literatures
A prominent strand in the international law literature that tries to
“unpack the state” focuses on the emergence of transgovernmental net-
works (TGNs, or networks) of domestic regulatory agencies and their in-
creasing role in global governance.300 A growing, related literature
emphasizes the distinction between “hard” international treaty law and
the “soft” (informal, non-binding) law that is generated by networks.301
For case studies and evidence to support their claims, both groups of
scholars naturally gravitate towards finance, where soft law-producing net-
works are prominent.302 This Article provides a critique of the networks
and soft law literatures and reveals that their conclusions are weak on two
be profitable. Adding in these details requires additional factual investigation. However,
when close descriptions of individual cases leads to an argument that the profit maximization
assumption should be dropped, the explanatory power of the original model is lost.
298. See id., at 295–302 (picking four cases studies, including one on money laundering,
without explaining why they were chosen, and fitting them into a 2x2 matrix defined by
binary variables of “adjustment costs” (high/low) and “disciplinary power” (strong/weak).
The “disciplinary power” variable is in turn determined by the “kinds of tools employed” and
the “effectiveness with which they operate.”); Gadinis, supra note 9, at 452–54 (creating a 2x2
matrix based on the binary variables of “market dominance” (strong/contested) and geo-
graphic “market centralization” (centralized/dispersed) and providing four cases studies,
which were selected because they “illustrate” each quadrant.); Simmons, supra note 17, at
601–15 (creating a 2x2 matrix based on the binary variables of “negative externalities” (sig-
nificant/insignificant) and “incentives to emulate” (high/low), and providing four supportive
cases studies, including money laundering).
299. DREZNER, supra note 7, at 6. See generally, Putnam, supra note 7.
300. See Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 18, at 212 (citing to the networks literature).
301. See supra 19 (citing to the soft law literature).
302. Informal Procedure, supra note 19, at 549 (“Nowhere is internationalization of ad-
ministration more clear than in the area of financial regulation.”).
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levels: (1) as evaluations of the concrete, welfare-enhancing cooperative
outcomes that networks and soft law mechanisms actually produce; and
(2) as purely descriptive assessments of the volume and proportion of in-
ternational cooperation on finance that is provided through networks and
soft law.
Transgovernmental networks have been defined a variety of ways, but
they share three core features: first, they are informal, multilateral bodies
that are not established pursuant to treaties; second, their membership
consists of domestic regulatory agencies rather than diplomats or heads-
of-state;303 and third, networks formulate rules and agreements that are
made by consensus and do not constitute formally binding international
law (thus, “soft law”).304 As a result of this structure, networks are seen as
essentially technocratic organizations that pool expertise rather than polit-
ical bargaining tables of high diplomacy.305 Several of the most high pro-
file networks—including the Basel Committee, IOSCO, and the Financial
Stability Board—are concerned with the regulation of finance. Crucially
for networks theorists, networks are not merely the instruments of states.
Instead, networks “allow domestic officials to interact with their foreign
counterparts directly, without much supervision by foreign offices or se-
nior executive branch officials”306 and thereby achieve a degree of auton-
omy from states which enables them “act independently on the world
stage.”307
International “soft law” is a vague, residual term that is used to de-
scribe international rules and agreements that do not rise to the level of
formally binding international law, yet retain some of the trappings of le-
303. In contrast to formal international organizations established pursuant to treaties,
such as the United Nations, IMF, WTO, or EU, networks do not possess an independent
international legal personality. See Raustiala, supra note 18, at 5 (“[TGNs] are ‘transgovern-
mental’ because they involve specialized domestic officials directly interacting with each
other, often with minimal supervision by foreign ministries. They are ‘networks’ because this
cooperation is based on loosely-structured, peer-to-peer ties developed through frequent in-
teraction rather than formal negotiation.”).
304. See Verdier, supra note 67 at 118 (“TRNs tend to operate by consensus without
formal voting procedures . . . [m]ost importantly, the guidelines and other documents they
promulgate have no international legal status, meaning that they do not create international
legal obligations and do not require the same cumbersome domestic ratification procedures
as treaties.”).
305. See International Law by Other Means, supra note 18, at 317 (“[TGNs] are task-
specific international organizations of financial bureaucrats. They engage in the sort of tech-
nical rulemaking in which politics are theoretically downplayed and expertise is valued.”);
Raustiala, supra note 18, at 24 (“The rise of networks is aided by the perception that many
regulatory issues are technocratic.”); Pan, supra note 156, at 255 (“[T]ransnational govern-
mental networks serve as aggregators of information and clearinghouses for the sharing of
technical expertise.”).
306. Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 18, at 215.
307. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Grand Strategy of Network Centrality, Center for New
American Security, in CENTER FOR NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 43–57, (Richard Fontaine &
Kristin M. Lord eds., 2012).
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gality and are not purely political agreements.308 Examples of financial
regulation through soft law include the Basel Accords, IOSCO’s Multilat-
eral Memorandum of Understanding, and codes of best practices such as
the IAIS’s Insurance Core Principles and Methodology. Soft law’s non-
binding character is said to provide certain advantages relative to hard
law, namely ease of agreement and amendment, and therefore flexibility.
At the same time, soft law allows states to spell out commitments more
precisely than is usually the case with high-level political or diplomatic
understandings.309 The soft law literature is connected to and overlaps
with scholarship on networks, because the outputs of financial networks
are non-binding and take the legal form of soft law.
A central thrust of the networks and soft law literature is that, as a
descriptive matter, “the ‘soft law’ character of international financial regu-
lation [i]n contrast to areas like international trade,” is an essential feature
of international cooperation on finance—or “how international financial
law works.”310 Importantly, this scholarship does not simply maintain that
soft law is a notable or non-trivial component of international financial
regulation, but rather concludes that the field is “dominated” by networks
and their soft law products; as Chris Brummer states:
[H]ard law institutions and instruments play a very limited role in
the regulation of finance, especially at the global multilateral
level . . . Instead, most of the sources of international financial law
are informal, intergovernmental institutions that set agendas and
standards not grounded by treaty, but instead usually operate ac-
cording to consensus and non-binding by-laws. Furthermore, co-
ordination is not dominated and led by heads of state, but instead
by central banks, regulatory agencies and supervisors, and finance
ministries.311
David Zaring also echoes the claim that finance is the exclusive do-
main of networks, arguing that, “it is only networks that are used to regu-
late international finance.”312 In a book length treatment of the subject,
Andrew Singer makes the somewhat more qualified assertion that
“[i]nternational financial regulatory agreements are a prime example of
308. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 19, at 422 (“We use the shorthand term soft law to
distinguish this broad class of deviations from hard law—and, at the other extreme, from
purely political arrangements in which legalization is largely absent.”); Andrew T. Guzman,
The Design of International Agreements, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 579, 583 n.18 (2005) (“There is
no single agreed-upon definition of soft law. One approach is to identify what soft law is not.
It is not ‘hard law’, by which is meant treaties or custom, nor is it a purely political under-
standing without a legal component. Rather, soft law is what lies between these two
alternatives.”).
309. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 19, at 423.
310. How International Financial Law Works, supra note 9, at 261.
311. Brummer, supra note 19, at 627.
312. Finding Legal Principle, supra note 19, at 713.
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‘soft law’ . . . At a descriptive level, the international activity of financial
regulation is consistent with the rise of ‘transgovernmentalism.’”313
Networks, and the soft law instruments that they promulgate, are not
only considered the most active participants in the international regulation
of finance, they are also held to produce results. The literature has attrib-
uted a strong role to networks in effectively facilitating international coop-
eration, both before and after the 2008 Crisis. In her seminal work on the
subject, Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that networks “solve the globaliza-
tion paradox . . . [by] expanding our global governance capacity without
centralizing policy-making power,”314 and in doing so, can “improv[e] the
quality and depth of cooperation across nations.”315 For example,
“[n]etworks offer an alternative to the paradigm of a regulatory race to the
top or bottom . . . network regulation avoids the race.”316 This positive
assessment has not been substantively revised in light of the 2008 Crisis. In
2011, Chris Brummer wrote that financial soft law can “help ‘nudge’ actors
into accounting for the negative macroeconomic externalities of certain
forms of business conduct,” and hailed soft law best practices codes as
“legislative achievements.”317 And in 2012, David Zaring made equally
strong claims on behalf of networks, declaring that they are the organiza-
tions leading “the international financial regulatory process, a process that
is likely to be the foremost achievement of international cooperation in
the twenty-first century.”318
Much of the networks and soft law literature, including the examples
quoted above, substantially overstates the concrete cooperative outcomes
that have been generated by these mechanisms. This becomes clear when
the output of networks is measured against the externalities posed by in-
ternational finance, as delineated by the four interdependence problems
presented in this Article.
First, the harmonization of standards has been handled at least as suc-
cessfully by purely private industry organizations, such as the ISDA and
IASB, as it has been by networks of regulators such as IOSCO or the
IAIS.319 In fact—although the networks literature distinguishes private in-
dustry groups from networks and argues that the former are inferior pol-
icy-making bodies320—one financial economist has hailed the ISDA’s
efforts as “the most successful international harmonization achievement
over the last two decades.”321
313. SINGER, supra note 17, at 9–10.
314. SLAUGHTER, supra note 18, at 167.
315. Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 18, at 225.
316. Id., at 217.
317. How International Financial Law Works, supra note 9, at 263, 279 (referring in
particular to IOSCO’s Core Principles).
318. Finding Legal Principle, supra note 19, at 686.
319. See supra Section II.A.
320. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER, supra note 18, at 9–10.
321. Herring, supra note 125, at 41–42 (quoting Richard Herring regarding the ISDA);
see generally Gabriel V. Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Assessing Transnational Private
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Second, in what is likely the most ambitious regulatory project pur-
sued by a network, the Basel Committee has taken the lead on ex ante
efforts to maintain financial stability through its capital adequacy require-
ments.322 But the first two iterations of the Basel Accords did not have a
discernible, positive impact on the risk-taking of financial institutions, and
Basel III pursues a roughly similar approach.323 The Basel Accords pro-
vide no support for Slaughter’s claim that network regulations present an
“alternative paradigm” that “avoids the race [to the bottom],” nor for
Brummer’s assertion that networks can successfully nudge private actors
into internalizing the costs of negative macroeconomic externalities arising
from their business conduct.
Third, networks simply did not address coordination of cross-border
bank resolutions before the 2008 Crisis, and early post-2008 efforts in the
area appear to have stalled.324
Fourth, networks have not been involved in the provision of an inter-
national lender of last resort function.  That role has been handled exclu-
sively by the treaty-based IMF, at times in concert with regional treaty-
based entities such as the ECB and European Community.325
And lastly, with respect to any of the four financial interdependence
problems, it is a challenge to identify what concrete progress has resulted
from the panoply of hortatory standards and principles documents issued
by networks such as the Basel Committee, IOSCO, IAIS, and the FSF.326
There is a marked disconnect, then, between the track record described
above and the achievements that much of the networks literature attrib-
utes to those organizations and their soft law products.
Putting aside questions of efficacy, this Article also shows that claims
regarding the centrality of networks and soft law to international financial
regulation provide an inaccurate description of the form that international
cooperation on finance takes. Far from being “dominated” by networks
and soft law, important aspects of international financial cooperation ei-
ther lack any legal dimension, or involve traditional hard law international
organizations. A clear example of non-legal cooperation is the prevalence
of  private industry groups, such as the aforementioned ISDA and IASB
which are as numerous and active in harmonizing financial standards as
Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: ISDA, the BBA, and the Future of Financial Re-
form, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 9 (2013) (arguing that the ISDA’s effectiveness as a regulatory body
has been largely overlooked).
322. See Barr & Miller, supra note 164, at 17 (“Basel Committee is perhaps the most
important example of a transgovernmental regulatory network that exercises vast powers”).
323. See supra Section II.B. Several distinguished commentators go so far as to claim
that Basel II actually increased the risk taking of financial firms, and that its “end result has
been a disaster.” ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 139, at 18. See also Lall, supra note 168 (citing
ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 30, for their argument to the same effect).
324. See supra Section II.C.1.
325. See supra Section II.C.2.
326. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (quoting certain provisions from these
documents as examples in support of Drezner’s argument that they are “sham” standards).
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are networks.327 Another is the central role of the G20, a purely political
forum led by heads of states.328 The G20 was the focal point of interna-
tional cooperation in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 Crisis, and set
the crisis management agenda.329 Importantly, much of the soft law that
has been generated by networks following the 2008 Crisis, including Basel
III, has been:  (a) an elaboration of policies that wereformulated by the
G20; (b) subject to the G20’s approval, and (c) drafted by organizations,
such as the FSB, that were established pursuant to G20 directives.330 Net-
works have therefore played an essentially ancillary role to the G20 in
post-2008 international cooperation on finance.
With respect to hard law, the IMF provides surveillance of the global
financial system and monitors the implementation of soft law principles
that have been drafted by networks and approved by the G20.331 Over the
past thirty years, the IMF has also regularly intervened in international
financial markets in its capacity as an international lender of last resort. It
seems fair to say that the IMF’s billion-dollar emergency loans—extended
during financial crises in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Russia—con-
stitute an effort at international cooperation on finance that is greater in
scale than all of the networks’s standards-and-principles documents com-
bined. Furthermore, since the 2008 Crisis, the potential breakup of the
Eurozone is widely considered to be the gravest threat to global financial
stability, yet the euro-crisis has been exclusively managed by a “troika” of
entities established pursuant to hard law treaties: the IMF, the ECB, and
the European Community. It is therefore inaccurate to claim that the land-
scape of international cooperation on finance is “dominated” by networks
and soft law mechanisms. In truth, networks and soft law are but one piece
of a complex patchwork of institutional forms that states use to address
the interdependence problems raised by global finance.
327. See supra Section II.A.2. Industry associations are simply groups of corporations
and by definition cannot formulate law of any kind. To the extent that they work with domes-
tic governments that implement their recommendations through statutes, they are a hard law
phenomenon. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 18, at 18–19 (citing to Slaughter’s distinction be-
tween private industry groups and networks of regulators).
328. See Institutional Performance, supra note 55, at 477, 485 (“[T]he G20 is not a legal
or technocratic institution at all; it is a modern-day Concert of Europe . . . [and is] antithetical
to the technocratic expertise that networks try to represent.”).
329. See supra Section I.D; Eernisse, supra note 84; Institutional Performance, supra
note 55 (arguing that this was the case).
330. Basel III was drafted at the behest of the G20 and subject to its approval. See supra
notes 87 & 173 and accompanying text. The G20 also established the Financial Stability
Board, defined its mandate, and requires the submission of its products—such as the FSB
Bank Resolution Principles—for G20 approval. See supra notes 85 & 86 and accompanying
text.
331. See supra notes 65 & 66 and accompanying text (describing the IMF’s many sur-
veillance programs).
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CONCLUSION
The law of international financial regulation was, until recently, a rela-
tively obscure area consisting of arcane agreements and acronym-laden
organizations. The New International Financial Architecture, a label given
to the cluster of rules and institutions assembled in response to the 1990s
crises in Mexico and Asia, embodied a technocratic ideal and for a time
appeared to be a regulatory success. But the global financial crisis of 2008
revealed the frailty of the NIFA framework in dramatic fashion, and gave
impetus to a new round of international institution building and regulatory
reform. In the wake of the 2008 Crisis, the question of how to ensure the
efficiency and stability of global finance has become a central issue for
international law, and the future of the world economy.
This Article has provided a framework that simplifies how this in-
creasingly complicated field can be understood. It has done so by identify-
ing the specific externalities that are a byproduct of cross-border finance:
the four interdependence problems relating to harmonization of stan-
dards, capital adequacy, cross-border resolution of failed institutions, and
an international lender of last resort function. Using a game theoretic ap-
proach that assumes states are the rational protagonists of international
law-making, it then analyzes whether or not international regulatory
projects—such as the Basel Accords, IMF surveillance and emergency
lending, or the G20 economic summits—have been or will be effective at
addressing the interdependence problems at issue. The mixed conclusion
is that post-2008 reforms will struggle to reduce the growing instability of
globally integrated finance, but will have more success with regulatory
harmonization aimed at capturing the efficiency gains that integration
makes possible.
Although skepticism over the effectiveness of the current financial ar-
chitecture may appear to justify a more ambitious regulatory approach,
this Article’s analysis has cuationed against calls for radical reform, such as
proposals for a World Financial Organization. Attempts to centralize and
legalize the regulation of global finance will suffer from the same
problems of incentive-incompatibility and information constraints that af-
flicted the pre-2008 architecture. A more effective approach is to pursue
incremental policies that focus on scaling regulatory cooperation from the
global to the regional level, or that harmonize regulatory standards in ar-
eas that present strategic problems of coordination rather than prisoner’s
dilemma-type cooperation problems. Two regulatory projects that illus-
trate the promise of an incremental approach are efforts to harmonize res-
olution plans for multinational financial firms and the development of
regional lenders of last resort.
Most fundamentally, this Article has sought to demonstrate that the
literature on international financial regulation and public international law
could benefit from an occasional retreat to the broader view, at the ex-
pense of close descriptions of recent or small-scale institutional trends.
Contrary to common critiques that make a straw man of rational choice
analysis, a bird’s eye, rational-state approach gets the big explanatory
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questions about compliance and effectiveness in international financial
regulation roughly right. At the same time, analyses that focus on fine-
grained descriptions or introduce more complex variables, the most impor-
tant of which are the networks and soft law literatures, can lead one seri-
ously astray. In comparison, the framework presented here has provided a
more accurate and parsimonious story of how international cooperation
on financial regulation works.
